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TRUST THE PROCESS: UNDERSTANDING
PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO
JON ROMBERG
Abstract
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court issued its first meaningful
decision in nearly twenty-five years addressing procedural standing—the
question of when violation of a statutory, procedural right presents the
injury-in-fact required for standing under Article III. The opaque decision
settled little, raising many important questions and leaving numerous
circuit splits and enduring confusion on matters of compelling importance
in its wake.
Procedural standing is a significant front in the Court’s nascent
separation-of-powers revolution that was fueled by the appointments of
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh and the retirement of Justice Kennedy,
who had been the fulcrum of the Court’s prior procedural standing
jurisprudence. Procedural standing will shape Congress’s power to enact
statutes that protect consumers’ rights to informational privacy in cases
involving data breaches and biometric hacks.
The Article proposes a comprehensive scheme for understanding
procedural standing under Spokeo and the concrete injury-in-fact it
requires. The key is recognizing that Congress enacts statutory, procedural
rights for multiple, distinct reasons, and that each category corresponds to
a different set of rules for assessing the existence of procedural standing.
There are two broad categories of procedural rights. First, there are
intrinsically injurious rights, the violation of which itself constitutes injuryin-fact. Second, there are instrumental rights—newly brought into the
procedural standing universe by Spokeo—the violation of which does not
itself impose real-world harm. Congress enacts instrumental rights to
prevent some other concrete, real-world injury. For one sub-type of
instrumental rights, instrumental automatically injurious rights, Congress
has concluded that violation of the statutory right is sufficient for standing
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even without additional evidence of concrete injury; for another sub-type,
instrumental presumptively injurious rights, additional evidence is
required. The judiciary should defer to these congressional judgments in
assessing procedural standing.
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Introduction
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,1 the Supreme Court accurately—and
unintelligibly—summarized the principles of procedural standing it had
developed over the prior twenty-five years. Procedural standing presents the
question of whether federal courts have jurisdiction to address claimed
violations of a statutory, procedural right under Article III—in particular,
whether the violation of such a right presents the concrete injury-in-fact
required for standing.2 As Spokeo explained:
[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In
other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any
1. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992) (holding “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” imposed by the “caseor-controversy requirement of Article III” is “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent”; “a causal connection between the injury” and the
defendant’s conduct; and proof that the injury is “redress[able] by a favorable decision”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
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additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified. . . . On
the other hand, [a plaintiff] cannot satisfy the demands of Article
III by alleging a bare procedural violation.3
Spokeo thus recognizes that in “some circumstances” involving a “risk of
real harm,” violation of a statutory, procedural right automatically presents
the concrete injury-in-fact necessary for standing; there is no need to
“allege any additional harm” beyond the procedural violation itself.4 But
how are those circumstances to be determined? In contrast, Spokeo also
recognizes that a “bare” procedural violation is never sufficient to produce
the injury-in-fact required by Article III.5 But which procedural violations
are bare?
Moreover, those are apparently not the only possibilities: The cupboard
is not always full or bare such that violation of a statutory, procedural right
either always or never satisfies Article III. Instead, a third set of
circumstances exists in which violation of the procedural right sometimes
presents a case or controversy depending on the additional harm or risk of
harm beyond the procedural violation itself.6 But what role does the risk of
real harm play in such cases, and how is to be measured? Does that
determination turn on the risk of harm to the particular plaintiff? Or does it
turn on Congress’s judgment about the likelihood of risk to the class of
people protected by a statutory, procedural right that generally arises from
violation of that right?7 Spokeo provides no clear answer to any of these
questions.
Moreover, without acknowledging the novelty of its approach, Spokeo
applies procedural standing principles to a different context than the Court’s
prior procedural standing decisions. In previous cases, two statutory,
procedural concerns placed the decision within the procedural standing
rubric.8 First, Congress had imposed a procedural decision-making

3. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50.
4. Id. at 1549.
5. Id. at 1549–50.
6. Id.
7. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (explaining “that an individual can[] enforce procedural
rights[] . . . so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened
concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing”).
8. Procedural standing is also sometimes referred to as statutory standing, or intangible
standing. Both Lujan and (with somewhat less obvious justification) Spokeo refer to
procedural rights as the unifying concept, but the procedural rights at issue are also statutory
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obligation on an administrative agency, constraining whether the agency
was obligated to make a particular decision and how the agency was to
make that decision, without constraining what substantive decision the
agency would ultimately make.9 Second, Congress had granted a procedural
enforcement right—a cause of action—that purportedly authorized anyone
to bring suit challenging the agency’s failure to comply with its decisionmaking obligation.10
In these prior procedural standing cases, the Court required that plaintiffs
demonstrate a particularized interest in the subject matter of the agency’s
decision. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce the
procedural decision-making right as against the agency in the absence of
such a particularized interest, notwithstanding Congress’s grant of a “bare”
procedural enforcement right purporting to authorize anyone to bring suit,
regardless of any particularized interest in the outcome of the agency’s
decision.11 In environmental cases, for example, plaintiffs are required to
demonstrate geographic proximity to the area the agency allegedly
endangered by violation of its decision-making obligation.12 However, so
long as plaintiffs have a particularized interest in the subject matter of the
agency’s decision, they need not demonstrate that violation of the decisionmaking obligation caused any further harm or risk of harm beyond the
denial of that procedural decision-making right itself.13 In other words, the
Court held that plaintiffs need not show that the agency’s failure to comply
and intangible, and the label is of course of little relevance. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549;
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
9. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see also William Baude,
Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 204–09; Christopher T. Burt,
Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275,
282–86 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 497; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517–18;
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8; see also Baude, supra note 9, at 204–09; Burt, supra note 9, at
282–86.
11. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–78.
12. See id. at 562–67; see also Summers, 555 U.S. at 497.
13. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (“The person who has been accorded a procedural right
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards
for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site
for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing
agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot
establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or
altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many years.”).
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with the mandated procedure caused or risked causing them any additional,
real-world harm.14
Spokeo, in contrast, involved neither a statutory decision-making process
imposed on an administrative agency nor a general grant of a “bare”
procedural enforcement right in any person. Instead, it involved a statute
that granted specific rights to particular individuals, as against a private
defendant, and afforded a right to sue to plaintiffs whose particularized
rights have been violated.15 So what does Spokeo mean when it pours the
new wine of particularized rights against private parties into old procedural
standing bottles—what new type of statutory right does Spokeo characterize
as procedural and thus subject to procedural standing principles, despite the
sharply varying implications for separation of powers for statutes directed
against private parties as opposed to those constraining agency decisionmaking?16 Procedural standing is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside the
enigma that is Article III standing.17
14. Id.
15. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545–46, 1548, 1550 (2016) (remanding to
the Ninth Circuit for further consideration of the existence of concrete injury in fact); Robins
v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Robins’ alleged injury
was both particularized and concrete).
16. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (“[T]he law of Art[icle] III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct.
at 1550–51 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that separation of powers has little
applicability to suits against private parties); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 61 (2012) (explaining that, unlike in Lujan, in suits asserting
individualized procedural rights as against private parties, “the separation of powers concern
[i]s entirely absent, since the plaintiff [i]s not part of an ‘undifferentiated public,’ nor [i]s the
executive branch the target of the lawsuit”).
17. This Article accepts as a given the Supreme Court’s conclusions—questionable as
they may be—about the requirement of concrete injury-in-fact for standing, and for
procedural standing in particular. Instead, this Article aims to provide a coherent account of
procedural standing that both makes sense, and that makes sense of the Court’s procedural
standing jurisprudence, including that in Spokeo.
As to standing, many scholars have convincingly argued that the Court’s newfound
insistence on concrete injury, beginning in the 1970s, is historically unfounded, not required
or suggested by the text of Article III, and not even a good proxy for when a litigant has the
incentive, capacity, and interest to be an effective advocate. The requirement of injury-infact under Article III is open to serious question and has been repeatedly and powerfully
challenged by academics. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative
Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 450–56 (1974);
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (“If such a
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Part I of this Article explores Spokeo on its own terms. On the one hand,
as Spokeo suggests, standing predicated on a procedural violation is in some
ways more difficult to demonstrate than standing in other contexts because
procedural standing faces the additional hurdle of demonstrating that denial
of an intangible, procedural right has resulted in concrete injury.
On the other hand, procedural standing is in some ways less difficult to
satisfy than other forms of standing. Lujan set forth the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing” to require injury that is “redressable”
and either “actual” or “imminent.”18 But in an enigmatic footnote, Lujan
qualified that principle in the context of procedural standing, explaining
that “[t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal
requirement of injury is a constitutional minimum that Congress cannot remove by statute,
the Court is either insisting on something that can have no meaning beyond a requirement
that plaintiff be truthful about the injury she is claiming to suffer, or the Court is sub silentio
inserting into its ostensibly factual requirement of injury a normative structure of what
constitutes judicially cognizable injury that Congress is forbidden to change.”); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on
Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170–71 (1993) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion
“is an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative power to make judicially
enforceable policy decisions”); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 217 (1992) (“Scalia reads Article III
broadly, invests it with general, controversial values, and ultimately recommends judicial
invalidation of the outcomes of democratic processes.”) [hereinafter Sunstein, What’s
Standing]. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How
Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the
Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2245 (1999) (comparing the “injury-in-fact”
requirements with Article III criminal standing requirements) (“Despite its apparent
reasonableness under current Supreme Court doctrine, I submit that no federal judge, if
pressed, would seriously contend that Article III requires that the United States must suffer
an injury in fact that is ‘personal,’ ‘concrete and particularized,’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical’ before litigation on its behalf can be brought in federal court.”).
Because the Court shows no inclination whatsoever to retreat from its approach to standing,
this Article takes the Court’s basic principles, including concrete injury-in-fact, as a given.
As to procedural standing, other than Justice Thomas, every member of the Court in
Spokeo, including the four liberal justices who might have been thought to take a more
latitudinarian approach to procedural standing, rejected Justice Thomas’s sensible embrace
of a sharp distinction between careful scrutiny of claims brought against public entities and
minimal requirements for procedural standing as against private entities. See infra Section
I.D. Whatever the merits of the Court’s rejecting such possibilities in Spokeo, the possibility
of revisiting those decisions seems vanishingly small, and thus the propriety of doing so is
largely beyond the scope of this Article.
18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
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standards for redressability and immediacy.”19 In other words, the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing is reduced in the procedural
standing context. But how can these principles of procedural standing be
harmonized, if at all? As Professor William Baude has observed, standing
for statutory, procedural rights is “one of the hardest questions in modern
federal courts doctrine.”20
Spokeo points to the important role of history and of congressional
judgment in assessing procedural standing, as explained in Section I.B, but
provides little in the way of clarity.21 It does not answer whether a historical
analog to the procedural right at issue is necessary or simply sufficient for
standing. Spokeo is similarly opaque about the role congressional judgment
plays in assessing procedural standing.22
The Court has been unclear and contradictory regarding whether
Congress can enact a statute that confers procedural standing that would
otherwise not exist. It has stated, on the one hand, that “Congress may
create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can
confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no
judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute.”23 In such cases,
“[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely
by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing . . . .’”24 On the other hand, “[i]t is settled that Congress cannot
erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”25
Spokeo attempts to square these non-overlapping circles in the
procedural standing context. Notably, it embraces Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Lujan, which, in addressing procedural standing, recognized
19. Id. at 572 n.7; see also Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 175, 185–87 (2012) (arguing that
procedural standing is simply an incoherent anomaly that cannot be reconciled with the
general law of standing) (“Congress has created procedural rights and made it clear that they
can be enforced without meeting the normal injury, causation, and redressability
requirements [of standing].”).
20. Baude, supra note 9, at 212.
21. See infra Section I.B.
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
24. Id. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3).
25. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (quoting Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)).
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that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.”26 Spokeo cautions, however, that “Congress’ role in identifying and
elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that
right.”27 The Court adopts the following, purportedly harmonizing,
criterion: “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context
of a statutory violation,” and concrete injury requires either actual harm or a
“risk of real harm.”28 Thus, Spokeo concludes opaquely, Congress validly
confers standing when denial of a procedure it mandates, though intangible,
is concrete, and when the risk of harm resulting from that denial is real and
not bare.
Section I.C then addresses the two confounding examples of procedural
injuries that Spokeo apparently suggests would not be concrete: (1) an
incorrect zip code in a credit report and (2) defective notice to users of a
credit report when the report contains no inaccuracies.29 Both examples are
mistaken in ways that are not actually relevant to the Court’s reasoning and
that distract from the Court’s intended approach to procedural standing.
Finally, Section I.D discusses Justice Thomas’s perceptive concurrence in
which he alone endorses a fundamental distinction between the sort of
procedural standing at issue in the agency decision-making cases and the
more generous approach that should apply to the private procedural rights
at issue in Spokeo.
In assessing procedural standing, one longs for the clarity and precision
of Justice Stewart’s famous test for obscenity: “I know it when I see
it . . . .”30 As the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged, “It’s difficult, we
recognize, to identify the line between what Congress may, and may not, do
in creating an ‘injury in fact.’ Put five smart lawyers in a room, and it won’t
take long to appreciate the difficulty of the task at hand.”31
Section II.A explains that procedural standing is both exceedingly
complex and of great practical import. The scope of procedural standing, if
26. Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
27. Id. at 1549.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1550.
30. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2018).
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read unduly narrowly, could sharply constrain Congress’s ability to enact
judicially enforceable legislation that grants rights against private
corporations.32 Procedural standing serves as a potentially oppressive
gatekeeper in the Court’s nascent separation-of-powers revolution.
Standing, including procedural standing, is grounded on the separation of
powers.33 “In order to remain faithful to th[e] tripartite structure [of the
federal government], the power of the Federal Judiciary may not be
permitted to intrude upon the powers given to the other branches.”34 Under
Spokeo, the judicial branch safeguards separation-of-powers, limiting its
own power and thus preserving congressional power. But how? By
exercising its own power to repudiate Congress’s power and refusing to
enforce the procedural rights that Congress has enacted with the express
purpose of judicial enforcement.35 This act of judicial jiu-jitsu—holding
that Article III limits the judicial power so as to preserve congressional
power, but somehow thereby empowers the Court to limit congressional
power—is enough to make Chief Justice Marshall blush.36

32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 17, at 233 (“For the Court to limit the power of
Congress to create statutory rights enforceable by certain groups of people—to limit, in other
words, the power of Congress to create standing—is to limit the power of Congress to define
and protect against certain kinds of injury that the Court thinks it improper to protect
against.”); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 275, 320–21 (2008) (“The Constitution charges Congress with enacting laws. The
injury-in-fact requirement, however, restricts Congress’s power to create rights . . . thus
prevent[ing] Congress from exercising the full extent of its power to create rights that private
individuals may seek to vindicate in the courts.”).
33. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (“[T]he law of Art[icle] III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
34. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
35. See Daniel Solove, When Is a Person Harmed by a Privacy Violation? Thoughts on
Spokeo v. Robins, TEACHPRIVACY (May 17, 2016), https://www.teachprivacy.com/thoughtson-spokeo-v-robins/ (“When Congress deems something to be a concrete injury, courts
should respect the will of Congress. The entire reason for the concrete injury requirement is
a separation-of-powers . . . protection of Congress against encroachment by the courts. But
the Spokeo[] decision usurps Congress’s power, curtailing its ability to define concrete
injury.”). As a commentator suggested of Lujan, “[t]he majority opinion . . . transposes a
doctrine of judicial restraint into a judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint.”
Pierce, supra note 17, at 1199.
36. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the
Court’s power to engage in judicial review of congressional action but declining to exercise
that power).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/2

2020]

PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO

527

The Court, apparently emboldened by newly confirmed Justices Gorsuch
and Kavanaugh and a newfound skepticism of procedural standing in the
Trump administration’s Department of Justice,37 has become increasingly
vigilant about enforcing its stringent view of the separation of powers,
including the tightly constrained role it sees for the judiciary under Article
III. Spokeo is thus in harmony with the Court’s other recent decisions in
Gundy v. United States38 and Kisor v. Wilkie,39 which strongly suggest that
the Court will soon employ separation-of-powers principles to undercut the
power of the administrative state, looking to Article III to constrain the
legislative and executive branches’ abilities to protect individuals from
corporate malfeasance.
Indeed, the Court signaled that it will continue paying close attention to
procedural standing in 2019. In Frank v. Gaos, the Court avoided deciding
a case on the grounds on which it had granted certiorari (the propriety of a
cy pres class action settlement of a claim against Google).40 Instead, at the
suggestion of the Solicitor General, the Court raised procedural standing—
an issue that none of the parties had raised—and remanded the case to the
Ninth Circuit for consideration of whether there was concrete injury
sufficient to support procedural standing.41 Absent procedural standing,
judicial approval of the class settlement will be impermissible, as will any
realistic prospect of suit against Google for the claimed violation of
millions of class members’ statutory rights of privacy.42
37. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support Respondent, Spokeo,
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5260469 (supporting procedural standing),
and Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 567 U.S.
756 (2012) (No. 10-708), 2011 WL 4957380 (supporting procedural standing), with Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct.
1041 (2019) (No. 17-961), 2018 WL 3456069 (suggesting the Court remand on an issue of
procedural standing raised by none of the parties and outside the scope of the question on
which the Court granted certiorari).
38. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
39. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
40. 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1043–44, 1046 (2019) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 1043–46.
42. Procedural standing and the question of how much risk of harm is necessary for
standing are also central to the Court’s upcoming decision in Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No.
17-1712 (argued Jan. 13, 2020). See Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
Thole addresses a circuit split as to standing in the context of ERISA claims brought by
beneficiaries of defined-benefit plans when defendants engaged in conduct that allegedly
harmed the overall plan, but with little or no risk that the individual plaintiffs will be harmed
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As Section II.B explains, such rulings will control whether courts permit
Congress and state legislatures to address informational and privacy
concerns raised by the actions of technology giants such as Google and
Facebook. On August 8, 2019, in a multi-billion dollar class claim against
Facebook, the Ninth Circuit held that Facebook’s alleged violation of
millions of class members’ rights under an Illinois biometric privacy statute
constituted concrete injury that afforded procedural standing under
Spokeo.43 Similarly, massive data breaches and exposure of biometric data
have become commonplace, such as the recent hacking of Equifax44 and
Capital One.45 Consumers will only be able to bring suit, and will only be
able to receive the much-publicized $125 recovery or identity theft
monitoring through settlements of such suits, if courts find procedural
standing under Article III. The courts of appeals, however, are in disarray
as to whether standing exists for plaintiffs whose private data or biometric
information has been breached, but whose identity has not (yet) been
stolen.46
Similarly, the rights of educationally disabled children may also be in
jeopardy. Such rights are almost entirely grounded on procedural
protections that mandate the process by which a school district must create
an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) rather than on the substantive
appropriateness of the resulting IEP.47 Will Spokeo be read to bar suit for a
school district’s violation of its procedural duties in creating an IEP unless
by that conduct. See id; Basem Besada & Brandon A. Slotkin, Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-1712 (last visited Jan. 31,
2020). The question of how much individualized risk of harm is sufficient for standing in
this context implicates the historical openness to such claims brought by trust beneficiaries,
even absent an individualized risk of harm, and a broad approach to standing that is in
tension with the Court’s general skepticism about standing in the absence of evidence of
such harm.
43. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2019).
44. Stacy Cowley, Equifax to Pay at Least $650 Million in Largest-Ever Data Breach
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/business/
equifax-settlement.html.
45. Emily Flitter & Karen Weise, Capital One Data Breach Compromises Data of Over
100 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/business/
capital-one-data-breach-hacked.html.
46. See infra Section II.B.
47. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206
(1982) (recognizing “the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures
prescribed [as to IEP formation] would in most cases assure much if not all of what
Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP”).
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the child can somehow prove non-speculative, additional, concrete harm
arising from the procedural violation?48
Indicative of the confusion and ferment in procedural standing
jurisprudence, Section II.B further explains that the Delphic decision in
Spokeo has given rise to multiple circuit splits, dissents, and dissents from
denial of rehearing en banc in the courts of appeals in the brief period since
the decision. For example, the courts of appeals are in significant tension,
and often outright disagreement, about whether a data breach and ensuant
risk of identity theft are sufficient for procedural standing. 49 The circuits are
split on multiple other issues as well.50 Perhaps even more fundamentally,
the cases have not even coalesced into different camps; the courts have yet
to develop a coherent theory—or theories—of procedural standing.
Part III attempts to resolve the opacity in the Supreme Court and
confusion in the courts of appeals by setting forth such a theory. Two recent
scholarly efforts attempting to make sense of procedural standing have
arrived at real-world dead ends. First, Professor Baude concludes that
Justice Thomas has the best of the argument in Spokeo by distinguishing
between claimed statutory violations of public rights (the traditional realm
of procedural standing) and of those against private defendants (for which
standing should be much more readily satisfied).51 However, while this
argument is historically compelling, no other member of the Court appears
to agree with Thomas, so the approach is of little practical relevance.
Second, authors Lee and Ellis analyze procedural standing in some depth,
hoping to derive an intelligible theory; ultimately, however, they throw up
their hands, announcing that they are unable to derive any single, coherent
theory that places procedural standing within the realm of general principles
of standing.52 They argue that the only way to understand procedural
standing is simply to conclude “that the Case or Controversy Clause has
two tiers” with completely inconsistent rules—a more forgiving tier for
procedural standing and a stricter tier for everything else.53
48. Cf. Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special
Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011) (explicating the primacy of procedural
protections under special education law).
49. See infra Section II.B.1.
50. See infra Sections II.B.2–5.
51. Baude, supra note 9, at 227–31.
52. Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 235–36.
53. Id. at 175 (arguing one tier applies when “Congress has created procedural rights
and made it clear that they can be enforced without meeting the normal injury, causation,
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This Article agrees that there is no single, coherent theory of procedural
standing that reconciles all the incompatible principles the Court recites and
announces in Spokeo. However, it makes the principles of procedural
standing intelligible by arguing that Congress enacts statutory procedural
rights that fit into multiple, distinct categories, and that a coherent set of
principles applies within each category.
Section III.A explains a fundamental, unrecognized development brought
about by Spokeo: it expands procedural standing to apply to a novel, third
strand of statutory rights that were referenced, but not actually presented, in
Lujan. Spokeo implicitly holds that procedural standing principles apply to
instrumental rights as against private parties, i.e., provisions that Congress
enacts not because violation of the right is itself a real-world problem, but
because the right is intended to protect against some distinct, concrete
injury with which Congress is actually concerned.
Section III.B then explores the distinct reasons that Congress enacts the
various categories of procedural rights: enforcement rights; decisionmaking rights; and, most notably, the novel category of instrumental
statutory rights. It also assesses the legislative judgments that Congress is
making when it enacts those various rights. Most notably, Congress enacts
instrumental rights when it concludes that it may be difficult to prove or
measure the existence of the concrete injury, or that the instrumental right is
necessary and proper as a prophylactic means to help prevent occurrence of
the concrete injury rather than merely provide compensation for its
violation. Section III.C explains that the judiciary owes deference to such
legislative judgments, so long as Congress is exercising its power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation between instrumental rights and
the concrete injuries with which Congress is ultimately concerned.
Part IV catalogs the various types of procedural rights at issue in
procedural standing cases: intrinsically injurious rights and instrumental
rights. In addition to enforcement rights, i.e., those granting a cause of
action, Congress enacts certain statutory rights—intrinsically injurious
rights—because it believes violation of those rights automatically
constitutes injury-in-fact.54 Intrinsically injurious rights include intrinsically
injurious intangible rights, which define certain intangible rights as
inherently legally enforceable, and intrinsically injurious decision-making
and redressability requirements . . . and another tier [applies] for all other cases, where the
normal requirements [of standing] apply”).
54. See infra Section IV.B.
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and dignitary rights, which involve procedural rights that govern decisionmaking such that the denial of the decision-making right itself constitutes
injury, without requiring proof of additional harm by showing that the
procedural violation affected the outcome of the decision.
Instrumental rights also fall into two sub-types. Congress’s intent in
enacting such a right depends on its understanding of the chain of causation
between the instrumental right and the ultimate concrete interest at stake.
For the first category of instrumental rights—instrumental automatically
injurious rights—Congress intends that a violation of the statutory right
alone automatically affords standing, without the need for additional
evidence of concrete harm; this is so because Congress has concluded that a
material risk of harm categorically arises from violation of the statutory
right.55 For the second category of instrumental statutory rights—
instrumental presumptively injurious rights—Congress has concluded that
concrete injury is likely to arise from the statutory violation, but intends for
courts to assess whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that a material risk
of harm to her concrete interests arose from the statutory violation.56
Part V canvasses the issues that Spokeo resolved, and those it left open.
It provides a concrete explanation of the best answers to the questions that
Spokeo and the courts of appeals have left unanswered.
Finally, Part VI applies the approach outlined above to various
procedural standing disputes that have bedeviled the courts. While applying
the proper approaches to procedural standing does not necessarily make
resolution of these cases easy—at least until Congress starts explicitly
expressing the category of instrumental right it intends to create—this
approach vastly simplifies and clarifies the questions that must be answered
to determine standing in cases in which plaintiffs assert procedural rights.
I. Procedural Standing Under Spokeo
A. Spokeo’s Explication of Procedural Standing
1. The Claims in Spokeo
The mundane claim in Spokeo belies its vital implications for procedural
standing. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo, Inc. for “publish[ing] an allegedly
inaccurate report about him on its website,” claiming “willful violations” of

55. See infra Section IV.C.1.
56. See infra Section IV.C.2.
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“a number of procedural requirements on consumer reporting agencies” that
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) imposes.57
Most notably, the FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of” consumer
reports.58 The FCRA also requires that credit reporting agencies: (1) “notify
providers and users of consumer information of their responsibilities under
the Act;” (2) “limit the circumstances in which such agencies provide
consumer reports ‘for employment purposes;’” and (3) “post toll-free
numbers for consumers to request reports.”59
Robins alleged that Spokeo’s report “states that he is married, has
children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate
degree,” but that “all of this information is incorrect,” thereby interfering
with his job prospects and causing him emotional distress.60 In its initial
decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Robins had standing because “he
allege[d] that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory
rights of other people, . . . [and] the interests protected by the statutory
rights at issue [were] sufficiently concrete and particularized.”61 As a result,
Robins was “among the injured,” and Congress could elevate the violation
of his rights “to the status of legally cognizable injuries.”62
2. Spokeo’s Superficial Holding: Procedural Standing Requires Injuryin-Fact That Is Not Only Particularized but Also Concrete
Spokeo’s holding is deceptively simple: Procedural standing requires
injury-in-fact that is not only particularized but also concrete.63 The
Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s holding, despite its
reference to both particularity and concreteness, turned solely on the
existence of particularized injury and entirely failed to analyze whether
Robins’ injury was concrete, thus requiring remand as to concrete injury.64
57. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2017) (on remand) (citing the
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(d)(1), (f) (2012)).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
59. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(b)(1)) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), 1681e(d), 1681j(a)).
60. Id. at 1546.
61. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Spokeo, 136
S. Ct. at 1540.
62. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
63. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50.
64. Id. at 1548 (“Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, . . . [the] independent requirement
[of concreteness] was elided.”).
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Spokeo for the first time clarified that the Court’s oft-articulated
requirement that standing necessitates an actual injury to the plaintiff that is
“particularized and concrete” establishes two distinct inquiries:
“particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact,” but
particularization is not sufficient because “[a]n injury in fact must also be
‘concrete.’”65
Thus, standing requires two things. First, the plaintiff’s injury must be
particularized—not merely an abstract, generalized interest in following the
law, but instead a personal harm to the plaintiff. As explained in Section
I.A.3, this principle undergirded the Court’s prior procedural standing
decisions, which held that a generalized desire to correct unlawful agency
conduct is insufficient to confer standing, notwithstanding Congress’s
attempt to confer standing through just such a generalized enforcement
right.66 Second, the “concrete” component of “particularized and concrete
injury” has an independent meaning. To support standing, an injury must
also meet the distinct requirement that it be “‘real’ and not ‘abstract.’”67 It
must impose “de facto” harm on the plaintiff, which requires that “it must
actually exist,”68 or there must be a “risk of real harm.”69
The Court’s seemingly simple holding was that “[b]ecause the Ninth
Circuit failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and
particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete.”70 This result
required remand for the Ninth Circuit to determine “whether the particular
procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to
meet the concreteness requirement.”71

65. Id.
66. See cases cited infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
67. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
68. Id. In coming to this conclusion, the Court evaluated the definition of concrete. Id.
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (1971); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 305 (1967)).
69. Id. at 1549. As the dissent explained, though the Court had quite often used the
phrase “particularized and concrete,” it had not previously been clear that those elements
were distinct; the Court had not previously held that statutory injury to a particular person,
arising from a congressionally granted right particularized to that person, was not thereby
concrete. Id. at 1554–55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1550.
71. Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit had no difficulty finding concrete injury along the
lines suggested by the dissent. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017).
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3. Procedural Standing Prior to Spokeo: Bare Procedural Enforcement
Rights over Agency Decision-Making Don’t Confer Standing
In order to understand Spokeo and how its novel approach fits into the
Court’s prior articulation of procedural standing, it is useful at this point to
pan back from Spokeo itself, and from its superficial holding that the Ninth
Circuit had simply elided analysis of the concrete injury necessary for
procedural standing. Only by first understanding these prior decisions is it
possible to revisit Spokeo, appreciate the novelty of the third strand of
procedural standing it introduces—instrumental rights—and understand its
implications for future procedural standing cases. Spokeo applied the rubric
of procedural standing in a context that significantly expanded the scope of
the doctrine as reflected in the Court’s foundational procedural standing
decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,72 and in subsequent cases echoing
Lujan, such as Summers v. Earth Island Institute73 and Massachusetts v.
EPA.74
In those prior procedural standing cases, two statutory, procedural
aspects had been present that placed the cases within the rubric of
procedural standing. First, Congress had imposed a procedural decisionmaking obligation on an administrative agency to constrain how or whether
the agency was to make a decision, but not what substantive decision it was
to make.75 Second, Congress had granted a procedural enforcement right—a
cause of action—that purported to authorize “anyone” to bring suit
challenging the agency’s failure to comply with that decision-making
obligation.76
Lujan involved claims brought by Defenders of Wildlife and other
environmental groups under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).77 The ESA
imposed a decision-making obligation on the Secretary of the Interior to
issue regulations listing “endangered or threatened” species78 and requiring
that other agencies engage in “consultation” with the Secretary of the
Interior to prevent agency actions that would be “likely to jeopardize the

72. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
73. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
74. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
75. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–71.
76. See, e.g., id. at 571–72.
77. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012); Lujan, 504 U.S. at
557–58.
78. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536).
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continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.”79 The
plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior alleging, inter alia,
unlawful lack of consultation about certain actions outside the United
States.80 The procedural enforcement mechanism came in the form of the
ESA’s “citizen-suit” provision that allowed “any person” to bring a suit
seeking to enjoin any person or agency he believes may have violated the
ESA.81
Lujan directly addressed the Eighth Circuit’s alternative holding that socalled “procedural standing” afforded the plaintiff environmental groups
standing, regardless of any injury to their actual interests. The Eighth
Circuit, the Court explained, had held that the ESA’s “citizen-suit provision
creates a ‘procedural righ[t]’ . . . so that anyone can file suit in federal court
to challenge the Secretary’s . . . failure to follow the assertedly correct
consultative procedure,” regardless of that person’s “inability to allege any
discrete injury flowing from that failure.”82
The Supreme Court rejected this approach to procedural standing.
Lujan’s core holding is that a bare statutory enforcement right to challenge
an agency’s decision-making obligation does not confer standing unless the
plaintiff has a concrete interest in the substantive subject matter of the
agency’s procedurally constrained decision.83 The plaintiffs could not,
therefore, enforce an environmental decision-making obligation that
Congress had imposed on an agency, notwithstanding Congress’s grant of
an enforcement right purporting to authorize anyone to enforce that right.84
Instead, to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show geographic
proximity to the area allegedly endangered by the agency’s decision, which
creates a concrete interest in the subject matter of that decision.85
In other words, Congress cannot confer standing by purporting to grant a
bare procedural enforcement right to sue on the basis of a general, nonparticularized interest in the proper administration of an agency’s decisionmaking obligations. If the plaintiff has a concrete interest in the subject
79. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
80. Id. at 559.
81. Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 571–78 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121–22 (8th Cir.
1990)).
83. Id. at 562–67; Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496–97 (2009) (“But
deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”).
84. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566–67.
85. See id. at 562–67; Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97.
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matter of the agency’s decision, however, then the enforcement right is not
bare, and standing exists to enforce the decision-making right—regardless
of any evidence that the outcome of a procedurally proper decision would
have differed.86
Lujan rejected the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress could
confer standing by granting a bare procedural enforcement mechanism for
an agency’s failure to comply with a decision-making obligation, regardless
of any connection between the plaintiff and the subject of that decision.87
Instead, plaintiffs have procedural standing to challenge an agency’s
violation of a decision-making obligation only if plaintiffs have a concrete
interest in the outcome of the agency’s decision. Moreover, Justice Scalia
specifically recognized the viability of procedural standing in the form at
issue in Spokeo but not present in Lujan, instrumental rights, explaining:
“This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest
of theirs . . . .”88
In Massachusetts v. EPA, which represents a high-water mark for
expansive procedural standing, the Supreme Court found that
Massachusetts and other intervenor states had standing to challenge the
agency’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases.89 The Court held that when
Congress grants “a litigant . . . ‘a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests,’. . . [the litigant] ‘can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”90 The Court expressly
embraced the D.C. Circuit’s recognition that such procedural rights,
accorded by Congress for the purpose of protecting distinct, concrete
interests, permit standing without the need to show concrete injury beyond
the statutory violation itself.91

86. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–67; Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97.
87. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 & n.8 (“[T]he court [of appeals] held that the injury-in-fact
requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract,
self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures
required by law. We reject this view.”).
88. Id. at 572.
89. 549 U.S 497, 526 (2007).
90. Id. at 517–18 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)).
91. Id. at 518 (“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a procedural protection to
which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive
result would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that the procedural step was
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Thus, under Lujan and the other archetypal procedural standing cases, a
plaintiff with a concrete interest in the outcome of an agency’s decision
need not introduce any evidence showing that the decision, if made
pursuant to the requisite decision-making obligation, would have actually
benefited the plaintiff.92 Phrased differently, the denial of a procedural,
decision-making right to a plaintiff with a concrete interest in the outcome
of a decision need not be proved to cause the plaintiff any additional harm
beyond the denial of that right itself.93 In contrast, congressional enactment
of a bare procedural enforcement right, i.e., an “abstract, self-contained,
noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures
required by law,” is insufficient to confer standing. 94 Implicitly, in a
principle not taken up again until Spokeo, congressional enactment of an
instrumental procedural right intended to protect distinct concrete interests
is sufficient to confer standing.
The Court first began to require concrete injury-in-fact and wrestle with
procedural standing after Congress enacted numerous statutes that imposed
procedural, rather than substantive, obligations on administrative agencies
in the mid-twentieth century.95 By passing the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)96 in 1946, Congress expressly mandated an “entitle[ment] to
judicial review” for any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute,”97 including the right to challenge agency
actions that failed to observe “procedure required by law.”98 As the
Supreme Court recognized in 1950, the APA established “a new, basic and
connected to the substantive result.”) (quoting Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v.
Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
92. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
93. Id. (“The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with
any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even
though the dam will not be completed for many years.”).
94. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
95. See Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 17, at 179–82.
96. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
98. Id. § 706(2)(D).
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comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies,” expanding
administrative adjudication in “one of the dramatic legal developments of
the past half-century.”99
In the following decades, Congress passed numerous statutes, largely
concerning the environment, that imposed procedural decision-making
obligations on agencies and granted an express procedural enforcement
right, either to anyone, or (opaquely) to anyone aggrieved by the agency
action. Prominent among these statutes was the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA),100 which requires “the preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)” before the government undertakes any “major
Federal action.”101 The Court read NEPA and similar statutes as imposing
action-forcing, procedural obligations on agency decisions, even though
those decisions are not subject to judicial assessment for substantive
wisdom.102
Congress similarly passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA), which was also predicated on a proceduralist conception, in
1975.103 As Professor Herz explained the vision, “We search for pure
99. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–37 (1950).
100. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012)).
101. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1989) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (2012)).
102. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978); accord Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28
(1980); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); see also Eric W. Orts,
Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1254 (1995) (“The primary
regulatory method employed by reflexive environmental law is therefore procedural; it aims
to set up processes that encourage institutional self-reflective thinking and learning about
environmental effects.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975) (arguing, prior to Lujan, that “[i]n the space of a
few years the Supreme Court has largely eliminated the doctrine of standing as a barrier to
challenging agency action in court . . . . Increasingly, the function of administrative law is
not the protection of private autonomy but the provision of a surrogate political process to
ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of
administrative decision.”).
103. See Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (ECHA), Pub. L. No. 94–
142, 89 Stat. 773 (superseded 1990). The act was renamed IDEA upon its reauthorization in
1990. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482
(2012)); id. § 901, 104 Stat. at 1141–42; see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (endorsing “the legislative conviction that
adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not
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procedural justice—if only we can devise exactly the right procedures,
outcomes will take care of themselves. In American public law, the
preoccupation with and confidence in procedural remedies peaked in the
1970s.”104 This background, which focused on administrative agencies’
compliance with novel forms of procedural obligation imposed by the
administrative state, paved the way for the first round of procedural
standing decisions, including Lujan.
4. Spokeo’s Opaque Recapitulation of the Established Principles of
Procedural Standing
Spokeo provides an overview of procedural standing by recapitulating a
grab bag of principles from previous standing cases—some that were
obviously within the procedural standing universe prior to Spokeo and
others that were not. It begins by briefly pointing to the separation-ofpowers underpinning for Article III standing generally, as well as the three
core elements of standing: injury, causation, and redressability.105 Spokeo
quickly focuses on the “[f]irst and foremost” of those elements: “injury in
fact.”106 Spokeo holds that injury in fact must not only be particularized to
the plaintiff, but also “concrete,” which means that the injury “must
actually exist,” and that it be “‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”107
The Court explains that “‘[c]oncrete’ is not . . . synonymous with
‘tangible,’” because even denials of “intangible injuries,” such as denial of
free speech and free exercise rights, “can nevertheless be concrete.”108 The
Court then notes the relevance of “historical practice,” i.e., whether the
injury is of a sort that would historically have “been regarded as providing a

all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP”); David L. Kirp,
Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841,
862–64 (1976). See generally Romberg, supra note 48 (explicating the primacy of
procedural protections under the IDEA).
104. Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1668, 1668 (1993) (footnote omitted); see also Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and
Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974).
105. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
106. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).
107. Id. at 1548 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009); WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 472 (1971); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 305 (1967)).
108. Id. at 1549.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

540

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:517

basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,” and thus so regarded by
the drafters of Article III.109
Furthermore, “because Congress is well positioned to identify intangible
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also
instructive and important,” both through creating “legally cognizable
injuries” and through the broader principles found in Justice Kennedy’s
Lujan concurrence.110 The Spokeo Court reiterated Justice Kennedy’s
statement that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before.”111
Spokeo, though noting “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating
intangible harms,” specifically reaffirms the holding of Lujan and Summers
that, despite Congress’s broad powers, its intent is not necessarily
dispositive: Congress cannot simply enact a procedural enforcement
mechanism (i.e., create a cause of action to sue for an abstract, non-concrete
injury) and thereby establish standing.112 A plaintiff “could not, for
example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”113
Concrete injury is thus necessary. But Spokeo is careful to point out that
not only harm itself but “the risk of real harm can[] satisfy the requirement
of concreteness.”114 By way of analogy, Spokeo points to the general risk of
concrete injury arising from the violation of certain categories of legal
rights that have historically been subject to suit under the common law.115

109. Id.
110. Id. (citing and discussing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
111. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 572).
114. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)).
115. Id. (“For example, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even
if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§§ 569, 570 (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (libel and slander per se, respectively)). Though the
Court does not mention it, suit has similarly been permissible, absent proof of concrete
harm, for claims such as breach of contract (in which nominal damages are recoverable,
regardless of actual damages); unjust enrichment; property offenses such as trespass; and
various infringements of intellectual property—all of which are actionable without proof of
harm. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 9, at 216–17. But cf. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625
(2004) (discussing certain defamation torts, unlike the claims discussed above, which are
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In a crucial passage, Spokeo observes that “[j]ust as the common law
permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted
by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in
fact. . . . [A] plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”116 In other words, the procedural,
statutory violation itself is sometimes enough to demonstrate concrete
injury (and thus afford standing) without the need to demonstrate any
additional harm under the facts of the particular case.117
Spokeo cites to Federal Election Commission v. Akins to illustrate this
point.118 Spokeo characterizes Akins as “confirming that a group of voters’
‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to make public
is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III.” 119 Spokeo thereby
identifies Akins, decided six years after Lujan, as a procedural standing
case—even though Akins does not appear to have anything to do with
procedural standing. Akins held that a group of voters had standing to
challenge the Federal Election Commission’s refusal to provide information
that the voters argued had to be disclosed under the Federal Election
Campaign Act.120 Akins referred to Lujan and procedural standing only in
passing, and by distinguishing Lujan because the claims in that case were
based on “generalized grievance[s]” and “harm . . . of an abstract and
indefinite nature.”121 Akins, in contrast, found “concrete and specific”
“informational injury” from denial of the statutory right itself, though the
Court also observed that it found “no reason to doubt [plaintiffs’] claim that
the information would help them (and others to whom they would
communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office.”122
Spokeo similarly points to Public Citizen v. Department of Justice as a
procedural standing case, establishing that “failure to obtain information
subject to disclosure [by statute] ‘constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to
“not actionable per se” and thus allow general damages only after proof of “special harm” of
a material and ordinarily pecuniary nature).
116. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,
20–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)).
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 11).
119. Id. (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25).
120. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19–21. The Federal Election Campaign Act can be found as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2018).
121. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23–24 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–78
(1992); L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)).
122. Id. at 21, 24–25.
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provide standing to sue.’”123 Denial of these statutory rights was sufficient
on its own for standing because the right to information was generally
intended to further a distinct, concrete interest.
Finally, Spokeo attempts to sort these disparate “general principles” into
two guideposts for resolving procedural standing under the FCRA:
On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to curb the
dissemination of false information [in credit reports] by adopting
procedures designed to decrease that risk. On the other hand,
Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a
bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the FCRA’s
procedural requirements may result in no harm.124
Spokeo thereby establishes several new principles of procedural standing.
The Court’s overt holding is that a statutory procedural right, even if
particularized to an individual plaintiff, is insufficient for standing without
some further connection to concrete injury. The Court also implicitly
establishes three further principles. First, statutory procedural rights as
against private parties (not just as against public agencies) are subject to
procedural standing analysis. Second, instrumental statutory rights—i.e.,
those enacted to further a distinct, concrete interest beyond the denial of the
right itself—exist within the procedural standing universe. And third,
“bare” procedural rights are no longer limited to enforcement rights that do
not require a connection to the possibility of concrete injury; they also refer
to instrumental rights if violation of the instrumental right does not give rise
to any risk of concrete injury to the distinct interest the instrumental right is
intended to further.
But Spokeo left even more questions unresolved. In some circumstances,
statutory, procedural violations do not require proof of further, concrete
injury. Which circumstances are those? When proof of further, concrete
injury is required, how is that determination to be made? When should
courts defer to congressional judgment about the chain of causation
between an instrumental right and the risk of concrete injury it was
designed to protect? When should courts, in assessing the existence of a
risk of real harm arising from violation of an instrumental right, find the
statutory violation itself sufficient for standing? And when should courts

123. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 449 (1989)).
124. Id. at 1550.
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require a plaintiff to show an additional risk of harm under the
circumstances of the case?
B. Spokeo’s Embrace of the Role of History and the Role of Congress
In the course of its discussion, Spokeo briefly nods to the role of history
and congressional judgment in informing the existence of procedural
standing.125 But Spokeo does not explain much further about either or,
notably, anything about the interaction between the two.
1. History
Spokeo provides a one-sentence explanation of how and why historical
practice informs procedural standing:
Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-orcontroversy requirement, and because that requirement in turn is
grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider
whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a
harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for
a lawsuit in English or American courts.126
The majority opinion provides no further analysis.
In contrast, Justice Thomas’s concurrence provides a relatively in-depth
exploration of the judicial treatment of suits brought against private parties
for violation of private rights. In doing so, he explains that “[h]istorically,
common-law courts possessed broad power to adjudicate suits involving the
alleged violation of private rights, even when plaintiffs alleged only the
violation of those rights and nothing more.”127 Despite the merits of this
historical approach, it was rejected by every other member of the Court
rejected (or, perhaps more accurately, ignored). Both the majority opinion
and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent require, for at least some types of claims
against a private defendant (including the FCRA claim in Spokeo), that the
plaintiff demonstrate a real risk of concrete injury beyond the statutory
violation itself.128
125. Id. at 1549 (“In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact,
both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.”).
126. Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
775–77 (2000)).
127. Id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra Section I.D.
128. See Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 47, 55 (2016) (“[H]aving put history and tradition on the table, one might have
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A critical question remains open on which the courts of appeals are split:
Is a historical analog to the asserted procedural right necessary, or simply
sufficient, for procedural standing?129 The Fourth Circuit held that a
comparable historical analog offers one route to procedural standing, but its
absence does not in any way cut against the existence of standing.130 In
contrast, the Third and Ninth Circuits have used language that seems to
suggest that a historical analog is necessary, not merely sufficient.131
2. Congress
Spokeo also acknowledges the significant role of congressional intent.
The Court explains that “because Congress is well positioned to identify
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment
is also instructive and important.”132 Spokeo then quotes Justice Kennedy’s
Lujan concurrence, which recognizes that “Congress has the power to

expected Justice Alito to address the rather robust Anglo-American history of statutes
allowing private parties to collect bounties for enforcing public duties. . . . But Justice
Alito’s majority opinion declined to engage with these or other historical statutory analogies
to the FCRA.”).
129. See infra Section V.A (explaining that the better view is that a historical analog is
sufficient but not necessary).
130. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[The
plaintiff] does not propose a common law analogue for his alleged FCRA injury, and we find
no traditional right of action that is comparable. The lack of a common law analogue is not
fatal to his case, but it also does not help him establish a concrete injury.”) (internal citations
omitted) (citing Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Vt. Agency of
Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)); see also id.
(concluding that Public Citizen “find[s] a ‘sufficiently discrete injury’ without finding that a
similar right existed at common law”) (quoting Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449).
131. Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2018) (observing that
the plaintiff satisfied “Spokeo’s congressional test,” and “the second Spokeo test, the
historical test, is also met. Because the statute meets both tests, and because Plaintiffs have
alleged sufficient concrete harm, they have standing to bring their claim”); Dutta v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In making the first
inquiry, we ask whether Congress enacted the statute at issue to protect a concrete interest
that is akin to a historical, common law interest.”).
Ironically, though Long articulates a more stringent test for historical analogy, it applies
the overall test for procedural standing flexibly, finding procedural standing to exist,
whereas Dreher articulates the proper, less strict test for historical standing but then applies
the overall test for procedural standing exceedingly stringently.
132. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
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define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case
or controversy where none existed before.”133
As detailed further in Part III, Spokeo thereby acknowledges (albeit
briefly) the deference it owes to congressional judgment about standing
and, in particular, to congressional judgment about the “chains of
causation” between instrumental rights and the ultimate, concrete harm with
which Congress is concerned. The Court, however, clouds the centrality of
congressional judgment in two ways.
First, it concludes that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury
even in the context of a statutory violation,” thus precluding suit based on
an “allege[d] . . . bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm.”134 This is the central disagreement between Justice Thomas and the
other members of the Court; the majority recognizes that Congress may not
enact automatically enforceable bare procedural enforcement rights, as in
Lujan. But it also rejects Justice Thomas’s approach, seemingly consistent
with Lujan, that instrumental rights against private parties, if particularized
to the plaintiff (rather than serving an interest in general compliance with
the law), are sufficient for standing. Spokeo requires a tighter connection
between the instrumental right and risk of the concrete harm with which
Congress is ultimately concerned.
Second, and more opaquely, Spokeo also complicates its boilerplate
recitation of standing principles by repeating the bromide that “Congress
cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”135
Facially, this reads as if Spokeo endorses the idea that congressional
judgment cannot alter how the Court would otherwise assess procedural
standing in the context of the instrumental rights at issue in Spokeo; this
language, however, simply means—or at least meant, prior to Spokeo—that
a bare grant of a procedural enforcement right is ineffective as to a plaintiff
who has no particularized interest in the outcome of a procedural decisionmaking obligation.
133. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
134. Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)).
135. Id. at 1547–48 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)); see also id.
at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a
plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a
person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.
Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
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Spokeo imports this idea of a bare procedural right into the instrumental
rights context without acknowledging the novelty or importance of this
move; the Court apparently concludes that not only enforcement rights, but
also instrumental rights, may be bare. Instrumental rights, however, are by
definition intended to protect against some distinct harm. In all but bizarre
circumstances, the distinct, target harm with which Congress is ultimately
concerned is a real-world, concrete harm. So the question is not whether the
instrumental right is “bare” because it has no connection to any concrete
harm, but rather whether it is insufficiently connected to a real risk of such
harm.136 Spokeo has metamorphosed bare enforcement right to mean
insufficient instrumental right.
C. Spokeo’s Confounding Examples of No Material Risk of Concrete Harm
The majority in Spokeo closes its analysis by providing two examples of
a violation of “the FCRA’s procedural requirements” that, it opines, “may
result in no harm” and thus amount to “a bare procedural violation.”137 In
particular, the Court expresses skepticism that either of the following would
establish standing: (1) a credit report that contains an erroneous zip code, or
(2) a credit reporting agency’s failure to provide the required notice to a
credit report user if the underlying information in the credit report was
entirely correct.138
As explained below, these examples are mistaken on their own terms.
Even more fundamentally, both can be misinterpreted to suggest a narrower
approach to procedural standing than Spokeo intends; misconstruction of
these two brief examples, tacked on to the end of the majority decision in
dicta, could sharply curtail the possibility of judicial redress for claimants
under process-heavy statutes, including consumers, environmentalists, and
educationally disabled children.
136. As explained in Parts IV and V, (1) for an instrumental automatically injurious right,
the question is whether the court finds Congress unjustified in its conclusion that violation of
the statutory right categorically demonstrates material risk of harm to the concrete right, and
(2) for an instrumental presumptively injurious right, whether the court finds the plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate material risk of additional, concrete injury. See infra Parts IV–V.
137. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
138. Id. (“For example, even if a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required
notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, that information regardless may be
entirely accurate. In addition, not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of
harm. An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to
imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any
concrete harm.”).
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1. Defective Notice to Users When a Credit Report Contains No
Inaccuracies
Spokeo’s first example is when “a consumer reporting agency fails to
provide the required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information”
but that consumer information is “entirely accurate.”139 The Court,
however, apparently misapprehends the nature of the notice the FCRA
obligates reporting agencies to provide to users of consumer information;
the purpose for that notice simply does not relate to the accuracy of the
information in the consumer report. The FCRA provision mandating notice
to users requires that a “consumer reporting agency shall provide to any
person . . . to whom a consumer report is provided by the agency[] a notice
of such person’s responsibilities under this subchapter.”140
And the user’s responsibilities under the FCRA do not relate to the
accuracy of the information in the credit report. Instead, those
responsibilities include the fact that consumer reports may be furnished to
users only for limited purposes specified by the FCRA, and that
“prospective users of the information [in a credit report must] identify
themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and
certify that the information will be used for no other purpose.”141 These
obligations on users of a credit report do not relate to the accuracy of the
credit report, instead focusing on users’ authorized purposes for accessing
the credit report, accurate or otherwise. Because improper use of even an
accurate credit report is unlawful and harmful, failure to notify users of the
scope of authorized use (intended to lessen the likelihood of unauthorized
use) is not made harmless by a report’s substantive accuracy.142
A significant concern would arise if one read Spokeo as if it understood
the nature of the notice requirement, but that it believed congressional
intent in enacting the FCRA to be limited to the single, overriding purpose
of increasing accuracy in credit reports. Under this construction, any other
purpose reflected in any provision of the FCRA that does not directly
further the single goal of accuracy could not possibly result in concrete
139. Id.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(d)(1)(B) (2018).
141. Id. § 1681e(a).
142. See Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding
Spokeo’s discussion of the examples to be “probably dicta, because the case before the Court
concerned inaccurate information,” and the Court’s rumination about claims of inadequate
notice from the agency to a user (such as a potential employer) entirely outside the scope of
anything possibly relevant to the case).
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injury. But this troubling reading (of Spokeo, and of the notice provision of
the FCRA) is entirely unconvincing; notice to users of their FCRA
obligations is plainly intended to increase the likelihood that users comply
with those obligations. And other constructions of this example are more
plausible.
First, the majority may have simply erred by failing to recognize that the
required notice to users informs them of obligations that are wholly
unconnected to a credit report’s accuracy. Second, the Court, in referring to
notice to users, may have intended to refer obliquely to the FCRA’s
obligation on credit reporting agencies to post toll-free numbers so that
users can request credit reports—a duty mentioned earlier in the opinion,
and one arguably rendered irrelevant absent some inaccuracy in the
report.143
Perhaps most charitably, one could read Spokeo as implicitly assuming
that the only claim that Robins raised was a violation of § 1681e(b), which
requires “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy.” 144
On that plausible assumption—which Robins expressly endorsed on
remand145—violation of some other FCRA right (such as the duty to
provide notice to users) could not contribute to the claimed violation of
§ 1681e(b) unless the failure to provide notice undermined the report’s
accuracy, the only purpose underlying the claim Robins actually raised.
Thus, the Court’s discussion of the notice obligation should not be
understood to suggest, problematically, that an instrumental right does not
afford standing unless it furthers the single, central purpose of a statute.

143. Consumers have reason to access their credit reports, other than contesting
inaccurate information, so the example would be misplaced. However, Robins may well not
have had standing for any violation of the duty to post toll-free numbers, either because
Robins’s complaint acknowledged he had access to his credit report online, so he was not
injured by the failure to post the toll-free number, or because, as Justice Thomas suggests,
that right is owed to the public as a whole, so Robins would need to show additional,
particularized and concrete injury not apparently present. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1553
(Thomas, J., concurring).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
145. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1116 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]ollowing
remand from the Supreme Court, Robins now insists that [his] ‘inartfully styled . . .
“claims”’ are not alleged as independent grounds for relief but instead serve as ‘merely
examples of Spokeo’s willful failure to use reasonable procedures and to assure maximum
possible accuracy in its published reports.’ Robins now states that he has alleged only ‘a
single claim for relief under Section 1681e(b).’”).
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Instead, the Court is either confused about the nature of the notice
obligation, or elliptical in its elucidation of that obligation.
2. An Incorrect Zip Code
Spokeo’s second example of a potentially bare instrumental violation is
even more confounding. The Court explains that “not all inaccuracies cause
harm or present any material risk of harm. An example that comes readily
to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the
dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any
concrete harm.”146
In actuality, it is difficult to imagine information in a credit report (apart
from, perhaps, a social security number) that is more likely than a zip code
to cause harm if incorrect. As the Court’s opinion observes, “Spokeo
markets its services to a variety of users, including not only ‘employers
who want to evaluate prospective employees,’ but also ‘those who want to
investigate prospective romantic partners or seek other personal
information.’”147 First, potential employers quite plausibly screen potential
employees based on geographical proximity to the place of employment,
for legitimate or illegitimate reasons.148
And those deciding whether to extend credit paradigmatically do so by
reviewing credit reports. As a historical matter, it is difficult to imagine a
piece of information more problematically related to the extension of credit
than zip code. Under this country’s troubled history of redlining, lenders
refuse to extend credit based on zip code (often with a discriminatory intent
or impact) rather than on individual credit-worthiness.149
146. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550; see also Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 128, at 60 &
n.102 (explaining that harm from an erroneous zip code is not hard to imagine, pointing to
the possibility that mail with an incorrect zip code might not be delivered).
147. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546 (quoting Brief for Respondent 7).
148. See Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 417 (2018)
(explaining that artificially intelligent hiring algorithms “might . . . hire applicants residing
in nearby zip codes and reject those living further away”); see also Matthew T. Bodie et al.,
The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1014–15 (2017) (“A bad
actor who does not want to hire African Americans or who wants to hire more white
employees can hide this unlawful motive by basing the decision on zip code, distance to
work, or something similar that targets location.”).
149. Michael Harriot, Redlining: The Origin Story of Institutional Racism, ROOT (Apr.
25, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.theroot.com/redlining-the-origin-story-of-institutionalracism-1834308539 (“Residents who live in redlined areas pay higher interest rates and are
denied mortgages more often than whites with the same credit and income, according to
reporting for the Center for Investigative Journalism. People in redlined areas pay higher
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The link between zip code and perceived credit-worthiness is far from a
historical relic. As President Obama stated in a 2015 weekly address,
Just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court . . . recognized what
many people know to be true from their own lives: that too often,
where people live determines what opportunities they have in
life. . . . In this country, of all countries, a person’s zip code
shouldn’t decide their destiny.150
Indeed, as the Washington Post reported in 2008 and again in 2015, banks
and mortgage lenders still use zip codes in deciding whether to extend
credit:
Critics call it the new redlining: Many of the country’s largest
mortgage lenders are imposing loan restrictions in entire
counties or Zip codes that they rank as risky or “declining.”
....
. . . If a major lender has tagged your Zip code, county or
entire metropolitan area with a scarlet letter—and they exist in
nearly every state, including many in places generally assumed
to have relatively healthy market conditions—you’re going to
need more cash upfront.151

auto insurance rates, ProPublica reports. Homes in black neighborhoods are valued, on
average, $48,000 less than homes in white neighborhoods with similar crime rates and
amenities.”). See generally David I. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the
Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1980) (examining the redlining problem
related to insurance and effectiveness of government actions attempting to address this
issue).
150. Weekly Address: Making Our Communities Stronger Through Fair Housing, WHITE
HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (July 11, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2015/07/11/weekly-address-making-our-communities-stronger-through-fairhousing.
151. Kenneth R. Harney, Zip Code ‘Redlining’: A Sweeping View of Risk, WASH. POST
(Feb. 2, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/01/
AR2008020101680.html; see also Emily Badger, Redlining: Still a Thing, WASH. POST
(May 28, 2015, 6:30 AM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/
28/evidence-that-banks-still-deny-black-borrowers-just-as-they-did-50-years-ago/ (“[B]lack
communities have warned that [redlining] still exists in subtler and changed forms, in bank
tactics that have targeted these same neighborhoods for predatory lending, or in new patterns
like ‘retail redlining.’ Some of the persistent redlining . . . still looks an awful lot like the
original.”).
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Similarly, “[e]xperts . . . say they believe banks may now be using data
collected by customers to compare them to other shoppers at individual
retail locations or by zip code, weeding out customers in neighborhoods
hardest hit by the economic downturn.”152 And potential romantic partners,
another target audience for Spokeo, are also highly focused on zip code,
both for concrete and intangible reasons.153
Concern arising from the Court’s zip code example does not relate (at
least primarily) to the Court’s surprisingly limited imagination. Rather, it
would be highly concerning if the Court were understood to require that a
plaintiff establish procedural standing for an instrumental right by
demonstrating a stronger causal link than that between an incorrect zip code
and the risk of real-world harm.
This zip code example, however, should be understood as judicial
myopia, rather than as an implicit imposition of an almost impossibly
stringent test for risk of real harm. A careful reading of Spokeo provides the
textual basis for a properly narrow interpretation. The opinion states that
“[i]t is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code,
without more, could work any concrete harm.”154 If one excludes the
relevance of anything more than the zip code error itself, then the Court is
best understood as simply intending to suggest that the mere existence of an
error in a credit report, without any evidence of some meaningful, real152. Chris Cuomo et al., ‘GMA’ Gets Answers: Some Credit Card Companies
Financially Profiling Customers, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009, 5:47 AM), https://abcnews.go.
com/GMA/TheLaw/gma-answers-credit-card-companies-financially-profiling-customers/sto
ry?id=6747461; see also Adam Tanner, Never Give Stores Your ZIP Code. Here’s Why,
FORBES (June 19, 2013, 08:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/06/19/
theres-a-billion-reasons-not-to-give-stores-your-zip-code-ever (“Why make such a big deal
over five digits that only records that someone lives in the same area as many thousands of
others? Because along with other information, the ZIP code may provide the final clue to
figuring out your address, phone number and past purchasing details, if a sales clerk sees
your name while swiping your credit card.”).
153. Lea Rose Emery, Tinder’s Most Right-Swiped Neighborhoods in Your City, BUSTLE
(June 15, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/tinders-most-right-swiped-neighborhoods-inyour-city-9413721 (noting that Tinder was able to identify locations in certain cities where
residents were more likely to be “swiped right” most often); see also Anna Davies, Here Are
the Dating Lies It’s Okay to Tell, N.Y. POST (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:20 PM), https://nypost.
com/2014/11/07/the-dating-lies-its-okay-to-tell/ (“Stephanie loved her Long Island City
neighborhood. But the 32-year-old lawyer was dismayed at the dearth of eligible matches
she found on various online dating sites—until she changed her ZIP code to the Union
Square area.”).
154. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (emphasis added).
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world effect, does not work a concrete injury, and the Court’s choice of zip
code as exemplar of triviality was oddly, but irrelevantly, misguided.155
D. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas concurred in Spokeo, expressing a historically grounded
openness to standing for particularized claims brought against private
parties.156 As he explained, separation of powers “concern[s are] generally
absent when a private plaintiff seeks to enforce only his personal rights
against another private party.”157 Justice Thomas’s concurrence points to
the historical distinction between the strict requirements of standing applied
when a plaintiff asserts public rights as against the government, as in Lujan,
as opposed to the much more flexible bases considered sufficient for
standing purposes when a private party asserts statutory rights as against a
private defendant.158 Thus, Justice Thomas argues that “a plaintiff seeking
to vindicate a statutorily created private right need not allege actual harm
beyond the invasion of that private right.”159
This position is entirely consistent with Justice Scalia’s observation in
Lujan that “it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the
concrete injury requirement must remain.”160 In an article that insightfully
highlights the numerous, puzzling questions that Spokeo left open,
Professor Baude recognizes the significant historical support for Justice

155. See Tyler J. Domino, Note, Certifying Statutory Class Actions in the Shadow of Due
Process, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1977, 1994 n.109 (2017) (“This aside about the zip code cannot
be taken literally.”).
156. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas’s heavy
reliance on historical understanding, and relative lack of concern with stare decisis, may
explain his openness to procedural standing, notwithstanding his general approach to
separation of powers.
157. Id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]here one private party has alleged that
another private party violated his private rights, there is generally no danger that the private
party’s suit is an impermissible attempt to police the activity of the political branches or,
more broadly, that the legislative branch has impermissibly delegated law enforcement
authority from the executive to a private individual.”) (citing Hessick, supra note 32, at 317–
21).
159. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
373–74 (1982); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939)).
160. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (emphasis added).
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Thomas’s distinction between suits against public and private defendants,
as documented by Professor Andrew Hessick and others.161
Whatever its merits, however, no other member of the Court joined
Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Indeed, his concurrence is in significantly
more tension with the majority’s analysis than is Justice Ginsburg’s dissent,
which was joined only by Justice Sotomayor. The dissent did not disagree
with the majority’s statement that an incorrect zip code (without more)
would not be enough for standing. Moreover, it did not suggest that a minor
error in a credit report would afford standing, either as a particularized
violation as against a private party (as Justice Thomas suggested) or even
because an incorrect zip code would present a risk of real harm using even
the most stunted of judicial imaginations.162
Instead, the dissent diverged from the majority’s decision to remand on
the issue of concrete injury unaddressed below because it felt the existence
of concrete injury to be manifest. Justice Ginsburg explained, in a
convincing but exceedingly narrow manner, that remand as to concrete
injury was unnecessary because Robins had plainly alleged a risk of real
harm: “Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins complains of misinformation
about his education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate
representations that could affect his fortune in the job market.”163 Thus,
because Justice Thomas’s concurrence is ignored by the rest of the Court,
and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent diverges from the majority’s analysis on
narrow grounds, eight members of the Court in Spokeo embraced applying
procedural standing principles to statutory instrumental rights as against
private parties.
II. Judicial Turbulence in Spokeo’s Wake
A. The Supreme Court’s Recent Intimations About Procedural Standing
In the wake of Justice Kennedy’s retirement from the Supreme Court and
the appointment of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, Spokeo has claimed a
seat at the war-room table for the conservative majority’s revolution-in-themaking. The Court has signaled that it will apply separation-of-powers
principles to limit the legislative and executive branches’ power to
161. Baude, supra note 9, at 227–30 (“Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion
in full, wrote a concurring opinion that put forward a proposed rule that is both theoretically
and historically consistent and that may provide a way to reconcile the tension . . . .”).
162. See supra Section I.C.2.
163. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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implement judicially enforceable legislation and regulations.164 One case
from 2012 and two from 2019 provide insight into the future of procedural
standing that the Court seems to envision.
The Court’s awareness of procedural standing as an important arena in
which the separation-of-powers debate will unfold has been manifest since
2012, four years prior to Spokeo. The battle began in First American
Financial Corp. v. Edwards,165 a case that Stanford Law’s Professor Pamela
Karlan and SCOTUSblog’s Kevin Russell called “the sleeper case of the
Term.”166
As Karlan explained, First American “float[ed] the possibility of a new
conception of injury-in-fact” necessary for standing, a requirement that the
plaintiff prove actual or threatened harm beyond the statutory, procedural
violations itself.167 In so doing,
First American had the potential to undermine an enforcement
technique Congress has been using in a variety of fields: having
proscribed certain conduct, Congress then confers a statutory
right to sue on individuals subjected to the conduct without
requiring proof of injury beyond violation of the statutory
duty.168
Karlan, in her 2012 article, pointed to the Court’s imposition of procedural
hurdles to undercut the other branches’ efforts to protect citizens. As she
observed, “In a variety of arenas, the Roberts Court has been cutting back
not on the content of rights or duties but on their enforceability . . . .” 169
That inclination has become even more pronounced with the appointment
of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.
First American involved a claim under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) that prohibited “‘any fee, kickback, or
thing of value’ in exchange for business referrals” in covered mortgage
164. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019); Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019).
165. 567 U.S. 756, 757 (2012) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted).
166. Karlan, supra note 16, at 61 (quoting Kevin Russell, First American Financial v.
Edwards: Surprising End to a Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 7:00
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/first-american-financial-v-edwards-surprising-endto-a-potentially-important-case/).
167. Id. at 61.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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transactions.170 Edwards alleged that First American had entered into such
“kickback” agreements, intended to result in exclusive referrals of title
insurance business, in direct violation of RESPA.171
First American argued, however, that Edwards lacked standing to sue for
the unlawful kickback due to an unusual quirk of Ohio law, which set the
price for title insurance.172 First American argued that, given the set price,
Edwards was not injured by the kickback scheme and the business First
American therefore received because Edwards was charged the same price
she would otherwise have been charged, even absent the kickback,
regardless of who provided her with title insurance.173 The Ninth Circuit
held that Edwards established an injury under Article III because “[t]he
injury required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”174 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, despite the absence of a circuit split, to consider this
issue of procedural standing.175
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts—no stranger to procedural
standing176—made a particularly insightful comment to Edwards’ counsel.
Roberts explored three possibilities for the role of concrete injury-in-fact,
beyond the statutory violation, in establishing standing:
I’m having trouble getting my arms around . . . what your
position is . . . [. T]here are three possible arguments. One is that
there is injury-in-fact in this case. . . . Two, that Congress
presumes injury-in-fact. Injury-in-fact is still required, but that is
presumed. . . . Or, three, that injury in fact is not required at all
[and the statutory violation on its own is sufficient].177

170. Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Frank
v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (per curiam) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2018)).
171. Id. at 515.
172. Id. at 516 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3935.04, 3935.07 (West 2019)).
173. Id. at 516–17.
174. Id. at 517 (quoting Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614,
618–19 (9th Cir. 2008)).
175. First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 564 U.S. 1018 (2011) (mem.).
176. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J.
1219, 1219 (1993).
177. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536
(2011) (No. 10-708), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2011/10-708.pdf. Indeed, Roberts shortly thereafter provided what may be a glimpse into the
basis for the Court’s ultimate decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
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Roberts thus identified a set of extraordinarily difficult procedural
standing questions that Spokeo leaves unresolved. If a plaintiff asserts a
procedural, statutory violation, what else (if anything) is necessary for
standing under Article III? Roberts identifies three options:
1) The plaintiff’s demonstration of further actual or threatened risk
of injury-in-fact beyond the statutory violation itself;
2) The plaintiff’s demonstration of actual injury, a showing that is
automatically satisfied by proving the statutory violation itself,
because Congress is entitled to conclude categorically that a risk
of injury-in-fact arises from the statutory violation; or
3) The plaintiff’s demonstration of only the statutory violation
itself, because injury-in-fact is not required beyond violation of
the procedural right that Congress has granted.
As this Article explains, all three of the options Roberts identifies are
valid arguments for procedural standing, depending on what category of
right Congress intends to grant when enacting the right at issue.178
Sometimes Congress intends that denial of the statutory intangible right or
procedural decision-making right is itself intrinsically injurious, regardless
of any additional injury-in-fact.179 Other times, Congress categorically
concludes that injury-in-fact is difficult to prove and materially likely to
arise from denial of the statutory procedural right, and thus concrete injury
automatically arises from denial of that right.180 And still other times,
Congress intends that injury-in-fact should be presumed likely to arise from
denial of the statutory, procedural right, but expects the court to assess the
particular facts of the case to determine whether that risk actually arose
from the violation.181
Since Spokeo, though the Court has not issued a major procedural
standing decision, it has not been silent on the issue. Procedural standing
played a prominent role in March 2019, when the Court went out of its way
to signal the importance it attaches to procedural standing in Frank v.

granted: “[I]t seems to me that you slide back and forth between [arguments] one, two, and
three, which makes it hard for us to get a decision.” Id. at 33.
178. See infra Part IV.
179. See infra Section IV.B.
180. See infra Section IV.C.1.
181. See infra Section IV.C.2.
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Gaos.182 Frank sidestepped addressing the substance of a prominent dispute
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) about the propriety of cy
pres settlements that provide no direct relief to class members. The Court
instead raised procedural standing as a potential antecedent bar to suit, and
by extension to judicial approval of settlement, cy pres or otherwise.
Frank involved a class action suit alleging that Google violated the
Stored Communications Act (SCA)183 by passing along to webpages,
without notice or permission, a “referrer header” that included the particular
search terms users had employed in arriving at the website.184 The question
of procedural standing had not been raised to the Court by either party or by
the objectors to the cy pres settlement, nor addressed by the District Court
or the Ninth Circuit.185 The Court, however, once it recognized the vehicle
problem of the antecedent question of jurisdiction, did not dismiss the
petition as improvidently granted like it did in First American. This was so,
even though the question on which certiorari had been granted turned solely
on the propriety of the cy pres settlement.186 Instead, following the
suggestion of the Solicitor General,187 the Court remanded to the Ninth
Circuit “[b]ecause there remain substantial questions about whether any of
the named plaintiffs has standing to sue in light of our decision in
Spokeo.”188 The Court’s decision to remand on the question of procedural
standing, unprompted by the parties and unaddressed in the lower court
decisions, suggests that its next procedural standing decision may be in the
offing.189
182. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1043–44 (2019) (per curiam).
183. Id. “The SCA prohibits ‘a person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public’ from ‘knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service.’” Id. at 1044 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a)(1)) (alterations in original).
184. Id. at 1044–45. The parties disputed whether the information divulged by Google
was potentially individually identifiable; Google had argued, earlier in the case, that if the
information was not individually identifiable, class members suffered no harm. Id.
185. Id. at 1044–46.
186. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Frank v. Gaos, 2018 WL 347810 (2018) (No. 17961).
187. See Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1045–46.
188. Id. at 1043–44.
189. Ironically, perhaps, the next such case might also involve First American, which in
May 2019, acknowledged that its website had exposed private information from nearly a
billion mortgage records for more than a decade. Nicole Perlroth & Stacy Cowley, Security
Gap Leaves 885 Million Mortgage Documents Exposed, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/technology/data-leak-first-american.html (“First American
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Spokeo is not merely an intellectually intriguing constitutional chestnut.
It is emblematic of the Court’s tentative but significant steps toward
amplifying the role of separation-of-powers principles in the October 2018
term. If read unduly narrowly, Spokeo may serve as an imposing
gatekeeper, employing novel separation-of-powers principles to hamper
Congress’s ability to enact legislation that protects the rights of individuals
from corporate defendants.
In June 2019, in Kisor v. Wilkie, the Court narrowed Auer deference,190
hobbling executive branch agencies’ power to interpret statutes within their
realm of expertise.191 Chief Justice Roberts concurred on the grounds of
stare decisis and refused to join Section III.A of the opinion,192 in which the
four-member plurality rejected the argument that “Auer deference violates
‘separation-of-powers principles.’”193 Kisor also suggests that a majority of
the members of the Court are open to overturning or greatly constraining
Chevron deference.194
Also in June 2019, the dissenters in a fractured Court in Gundy v. United
States signaled their willingness to sharply constrain congressional
lawmaking power through a stringent reading of separation of powers
principles.195 This approach would jettison more than eight decades of
precedent under which Congress has enjoyed broad power to delegate rulemaking authority to executive branch agencies.196 Though a plurality of
Financial Corporation, a provider of title insurance, said Friday that it had fixed a
vulnerability in its website that exposed 885 million records related to mortgage deals going
back 16 years. The vulnerability would have allowed anyone to gain access to Social
Security numbers, bank account details, drivers license and mortgage and tax records.”).
190. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (defining Auer deference as
“defer[ing] to agencies’ reasonable readings of genuinely ambiguous regulations”).
191. Id. at 2418, 2423.
192. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).
193. Id. at 2421–22.
194. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, so stated in dissent in
Kisor. Id. at 2446 n.114 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, expressed serious reservations
about Chevron deference as early as 2013. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
195. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“Working from an understanding of the Constitution at war with its text and history, the
plurality reimagines the terms of the statute before us and insists there is nothing wrong with
Congress handing off so much power to the Attorney General.”).
196. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”);
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four justices retained the long-standing rule, Justice Kavanaugh did not take
part in the decision,197 and Justice Alito stated in his concurrence that “[i]f a
majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”198
In dissent, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, expressed an overt desire to construe the Constitution as imposing
strict limits on Congress’s ability to enact enforceable laws. In doing so, he
opined that the framers
believed the new federal government’s most dangerous power
was the power to enact laws restricting the people’s liberty. An
“excess of law-making” was, in their words, one of “the diseases
to which our governments are most liable.” To address that
tendency, the framers went to great lengths to make lawmaking
difficult.199
If Spokeo is read unduly narrowly as supporting this perspective, Congress
may face difficulty in enacting legislation to protect intangible or uncertain
injuries through instrumental rights.
Professor Michael Herz explains that, “In Gundy, as [in Kisor, Justices]
Kagan and Gorsuch wrote competing opinions in which the first calmly
stood by long-standing principles and the other fulminated about a
fundamental violation of separation of powers.”200 In cases that follow
Spokeo, procedural standing provides another arena in which the Court may
similarly invoke Article III to limit the power of the other branches and take
action to protect individuals against corporate intrusion into their intangible
interests in information, privacy, special education, and consumer rights.

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944) (“Congress is not confined to that
method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to
administrative officers.”).
197. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.
198. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
199. Id. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO.
48, at 309–312 (James Madison)) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James
Madison)). As the plurality observed, “Indeed, if . . . delegation [in this case] is
unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on
the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.” Id. at 2130.
200. Michael Herz, Symposium: In “Gundy II,” Auer Survives by a Vote of 4.6 to 4.4,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/
symposium-in-gundy-ii-auer-survives-by-a-vote-of-4-6-to-4-4/.
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Finally, in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, the Court
issued an almost entirely unnoticed procedural standing ruling at the end of
its October 2018 term.201 The Court was highly flexible in finding sufficient
evidence of risk of concrete injury—and, in turn, procedural standing—for
a trade association of grocery retailer intervenors objecting to the disclosure
of information under FOIA.202 The federal appellate court had specifically
concluded that, although “releasing the contested data is likely to make
[competitors’] statistical models marginally more accurate,” the “contested
data . . . lacked the specificity needed [for competitors] to gain material
insight into an individual store[],”203 but the Supreme Court ignored this
factual finding in the course of finding sufficient concrete injury for
standing.204 If one read Spokeo narrowly to require that harm be material to
constitute injury-in-fact, one would be tempted to conclude that release of
the contested data in Argus Leader was akin to an erroneous zip code—a
technical harm, to be sure, but one specifically found to lack evidence of
material effect, thus arguably lacking risk of real harm. Nonetheless, the
Court found procedural standing.205
The basis for the Court’s openness to finding risk of real harm, despite
the court of appeals’ conclusion of no material harm, is unclear.206 The
holding of Argus Leader, however, is best understood to reinforce the
reading of Spokeo advanced in Section I.C.2, cabining any implications
from Spokeo’s zip code example that might suggest that courts should
scrutinize the extent of harm, rather than the realistic risk of harm, when
assessing the possible real-world consequences of statutory violations.
B. Confusion in the Courts of Appeals
In addition to signs of continued ferment in the Supreme Court, the
courts of appeals have been in disarray following Spokeo, with numerous
201. 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2362 (2019).
202. Id. at 2361–62. Plaintiffs seeking information under FOIA have procedural standing
under such cases as Akins as an instrumental intrinsically injurious right, because Congress
has granted a statutory right to the information, which it believes generally useful, without
the need for proof of concrete injury if the information were denied. But objectors to
disclosure need to show risk of real harm from disclosure to show concrete injury-in-fact.
203. Argus Leader Media v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 889 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2018),
rev’d sub nom. Food Mktg., 139 S. Ct. at 2356 (emphasis added).
204. Food Mktg., 139 S. Ct. at 2362.
205. Id.
206. It might be indicative of the majority’s sympathy to the interests of a corporate trade
group, as opposed to the consumers bringing suit in Spokeo and similar cases.
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split decisions and circuit splits and no consensus about the rules that apply
when analyzing procedural standing. Cases typically quote the set of
general principles articulated in Spokeo—including that violation of some
statutory procedural rights is sufficient on its own for standing, and that an
erroneous zip code without more is an example of a bare procedural right
insufficient for standing—then announce a result consistent with some
subset of Spokeo’s principles without explaining the basis for choosing
among them.207
The cases regularly point to Spokeo’s recognition of a risk of real harm
as the general benchmark for procedural standing, contrasting such a risk
with bare procedural rights insufficient for standing. But the cases fail to
elucidate several fundamental questions underlying any such criterion:
Does the material risk test differentiate between cases in which plaintiffs
must demonstrate additional harm beyond the statutory violation and those
in which they do not, or is that test the means by which to measure whether
plaintiffs have demonstrated such additional harm (or both)? To what extent
should the court defer to congressional judgment in assessing material risk?
Is material risk of harm assessed generally, on the basis of the statutory
right that has allegedly been violated, or more narrowly, as a matter of the
consequences of the violation for the particular plaintiff? Or do the answers
to these questions change, depending on some unidentified distinction? The
courts do not identify, let alone answer, these questions.208
1. Collecting, Retaining, and Failing to Secure Information
Perhaps the most notable division in the courts of appeals involves cases
challenging statutorily prohibited collection and retention of information,
(often followed by data breach of that information) and the resultant risk of
identity theft. Given a defendant’s violation of a statutory obligation
concerning privacy of information or biometric data, what more (if
anything) must plaintiffs show to demonstrate sufficient harm, or risk of
real harm, beyond the violation itself? Does unauthorized collection or
retention of information cause concrete harm or risk of harm, or must some
real risk of use or transmission of the information, or other real-world
consequence, be shown? Does violation of a duty to secure information that
results in data breach suffice to show concrete injury, or must some further
evidence of identity theft, or risk of identity theft, be shown? Procedural
207. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Section I.B (noting an apparent (unrecognized) circuit split over whether
a historical analog is necessary or sufficient for procedural standing).
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standing in significant part drives the viability of lawsuits—and of class
action settlement of such suits—in prominent cases like the Equifax data
breach.209
As the Fourth Circuit recognizes:
Our sister circuits are divided on whether a plaintiff may
establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk
of future identity theft. The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
have all recognized, at the pleading stage, that plaintiffs can
establish an injury-in-fact based on this threatened injury.[210] By
contrast, the First and Third Circuits have rejected such
allegations.211
The Fourth Circuit, citing to the Third Circuit’s acceptance of such an
argument and the Seventh Circuit’s rejection, also observes that “[i]n
Spokeo’s aftermath, some plaintiffs have attempted to establish Article III
standing by alleging that the violation of a privacy statute, in and of itself, is
sufficiently ‘concrete’ to establish an ‘injury-in-fact,’ to varying result.”212
The Seventh Circuit, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, found
that a class of 350,000 customers had standing when they sued Neiman
Marcus for a data breach that compromised their credit card information.213
Plaintiffs alleged that every class member’s “personal data ha[d] already
been stolen,” thousands of plaintiffs had already “incurred fraudulent
charges,” and “a concrete risk of harm [exists] for the rest.”214 The court
agreed, explaining that “it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown
a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach. Why else

209. See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 44 (describing the settlement, involving 147,000,000
class members, that requires Equifax to pay at least $650,000,000).
210. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Galaria v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2015); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d
1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632–34 (7th
Cir. 2007)).
211. Id. at 273–74 (citing Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012); Reilly
v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 44 (3d Cir. 2011)).
212. Id. at 271 n.4 (citing In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc., 846 F.3d 625, 640–41 (3d
Cir. 2017); Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2017)).
213. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690, 697.
214. Id. at 692.
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would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private
information?”215
In contrast, a similar complaint was filed in the Fourth Circuit, though
there was no proof that identity theft had already occurred.216 Though this
factual difference has some relevance, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
contrasted sharply with that of the Seventh, going so far as to reject
“standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm [of identity theft] will
occur.”217 The Fourth Circuit reasoned, “[e]ven if we credit the Plaintiffs’
allegation that 33% of those affected by [the] data breaches will become
victims of identity theft,”218 and even if “data breach victims are 9.5 times
more likely [than the average person] to suffer identity theft,”219 these
“statistic[s] fall[] far short of establishing a ‘substantial’ risk of harm.”220 It
is difficult, however, to reconcile the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a onethird chance of the severe consequences arising from identity theft falls “far
short” of the risk of real harm sufficient for standing when the Supreme
Court has held that “an identifiable trifle is enough for standing.”221
In a trio of 2017 cases, the Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits similarly
arrived at sharply conflicting outcomes. In direct contrast to the Fourth
Circuit, the Third Circuit held that “violation of [plaintiffs’] statutory right
to have their personal information secured against unauthorized disclosure
constitutes, in and of itself, an injury in fact.”222 The majority found that
Congress expressed concern about unauthorized disclosure of private

215. Id. at 693.
216. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
217. Id. at 275.
218. Id. at 275–76.
219. Id. at 276 (quoting Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533
(D. Md. 2016)).
220. Id. at 276 & n.7. Beck also expressly disagreed with the Sixth and Seventh Circuit’s
recognition of the relevance of the defendant’s offer of free credit monitoring. Id. at 276 &
n.8. Instead, the court held that “a threatened event can be ‘reasonabl[y] likel[y]’ to occur
but still be insufficiently ‘imminent’ to constitute an injury-in-fact.” Id. at 276 (citing
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147–48 (2013)) (alterations in original).
Ultimately, Beck ignored Lujan’s conclusion that procedural standing does not require a
showing of immediacy. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7, 573 n.8
(1992).
221. United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
601, 613 (1968)).
222. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc., 846 F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2017).
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information when enacting the statutory provision at issue.223 Because
Congress elevated this privacy concern to a legal right, the procedural
violation was not bare and thereby constituted concrete harm, even without
regard to any consequent risk of identity theft.224
The Third Circuit further reasoned that the risk of future harm in the
form of identity theft was sufficient for standing, thereby crediting as a
material risk the allegation that “those whose personal information has been
stolen are ‘approximately 9.5 times more likely than the general public to
suffer identity fraud or identity theft’”—precisely the same fact that the
Fourth Circuit rejected as immaterial.225 The Third Circuit recognized that,
although “it is possible to read . . . Spokeo as creating a requirement that a
plaintiff show a statutory violation has caused a ‘material risk of harm’
before he can bring suit, we do not believe that the Court so intended to
change the traditional standard”—thereby expressly rejecting the Eight
Circuit’s contrary interpretation.226 In doing so, the Third Circuit implicitly
recognized that a risk of real harm must exist, but that a plaintiff need not
show it, so long as Congress concluded that such risk automatically arises
from the statutory violation.
The Eighth Circuit found standing for one class representative (and
therefore for the class as a whole) who alleged identity theft after a data
breach; the court, however, rejected standing for fifteen other class
representatives whose data had been stolen but who had not alleged they
had already experienced identity theft.227 Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the
D.C. Circuit mirrored the Third Circuit, finding standing for all individuals
whose data had been stolen, based on the risk of future identity theft, and
specifically disclaimed reliance on the two class members who alleged they
“had already suffered identity theft as a result of the breach.”228 The court
reasoned that “an unauthorized party has already accessed personally
identifying data” by breaching the servers, and “it is plausible[] to infer that
this party has both the intent and the ability to use that data for ill.”229 In

223. Id. at 639.
224. Id. at 639 & n.19.
225. Id. at 634, 639 n.19 (quoting the briefs).
226. Id. at 637–38, 637 n.17 (footnote and citation omitted) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016)).
227. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–74 (8th Cir. 2017).
228. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
229. Id. at 628.
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such cases, “a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of
the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”230
The cases are fundamentally and hopelessly inconsistent on an issue
underlying cases of immense practical importance: Does a plaintiff have
standing to sue when her private data has been breached, in violation of a
statutory privacy right, (1) even absent evidence that the breach has yet
resulted in identity theft for anyone subject to that breach, given the
heightened risk that such identity theft will occur? (2) with evidence that
the breach has resulted in identity theft for some of those subject to the
breach? or (3) only with evidence that the breach has resulted in identity
theft for the plaintiff, personally?
2. The Obligation to Notify Consumers that Disputes Must Be in Writing
A direct circuit split also exists under a Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) provision that requires debt collectors to provide consumers
notice that their dispute of a debt must be in writing.231 The Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits held that procedural standing exists for such violations
because, as the Sixth Circuit explained, “[w]ithout the information about
the in-writing requirement, Plaintiffs were placed at a materially greater
risk of falling victim to ‘abusive debt collection practices.’”232 The Seventh
Circuit, in contrast, expressly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion,
holding that the failure to provide the mandated notice was insufficient for
standing: the particular plaintiff never disputed her debt (in writing or
otherwise), thus she was not harmed or at risk of harm from the lack of
notice that such disputes must be in writing.233
The Second Circuit largely sided with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits in
Strubel v. Comenity Bank, a particularly thoughtful decision that addressed
claims under the Truth in Lending Act.234 In Strubel, the court found

230. Id. at 629.
231. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2018).
232. Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 756, 758 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1692(e)) (footnote omitted); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F.
App’x 990, 994–95 (11th Cir. 2016).
233. Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 335–36 (7th Cir. 2019) (“It is
not enough that the omission risked harming someone—it must have risked harm to the
plaintiffs.”). Three Seventh Circuit judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at
336 n.4.
234. 842 F.3d 181, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2016). The statutory protection here required
“creditors to provide credit card holders . . . with ‘[a] statement, in a form prescribed by
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concrete injury arising from a violation of the requirement that a lender
provide “notice that . . . a consumer dissatisfied with a credit card purchase
must contact the creditor in writing or electronically.”235 The court
reasoned:
A consumer who is not given notice of his obligations is likely
not to satisfy them and, thereby, unwittingly to lose the very
credit rights that the law affords him. For that reason, a creditor’s
alleged violation of [this] notice requirement, by itself, gives rise
to a “risk of real harm” to the consumer’s concrete interest in the
informed use of credit.236
Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned, “Having alleged such procedural
violations, [the plaintiff] was not required to allege ‘any additional harm’ to
demonstrate the concrete injury necessary for standing”—placing it in
significant tension with the Seventh Circuit.237 The cases thus conflict on
whether failure to comply with a consumer notice obligation that Congress
intended to protect a class of consumers suffices for standing absent
individualized proof that the absence of notice harmed the particular
plaintiff.
3. Disclosing Excessive Information on a Credit Card Receipt
The courts of appeals are also in sharp disagreement about procedural
standing for violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(FACTA), an amendment to FCRA that prohibits merchants from printing
“more than the last 5 digits of the card number or [printing] the expiration
date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or
transaction.”238 Most notably, the Third Circuit has recognized its direct
conflict with the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the
structure and purpose of FACTA show that it provides customers the right
to enforce the nondisclosure of their untruncated credit card numbers,
similar to the rights and harms” in common law breach of privacy and
regulations of the Bureau[,] of the protection provided by sections 1666 and 1666i.’” Id. at
186 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(7)) (alterations in original).
235. Id. at 190.
236. Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
237. Id. at 191 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). Casillas attempts to reconcile Strubel
by observing that Strubel involved an open-ended credit relationship, whereas in Casillas the
plaintiff knew she would not dispute the debt when she received the non-compliant notice of
her rights. Casillas, 926 F.3d at 336–37.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2018).
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breach of confidence torts.239 The court thus concluded that “[t]he resulting
harm from [FACTA’s] violation is ‘concrete in the sense that it involves a
clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected
information.’”240
The Third Circuit expressly disagreed. Although FACTA specifically
prohibits disclosure of credit card information on a “receipt provided to the
cardholder at the point of the sale”—exactly what the plaintiff had
alleged—the court found no material risk of harm in such disclosure
because the plaintiff had not alleged the information on the receipt had been
disclosed to any third party who might engage in identity theft.241 The
courts thus disagreed about whether violation of a statutory right to
information privacy granted by Congress to protect a class of consumers is
sufficient for standing, absent evidence of a heightened risk of harm to the
individual plaintiff.
4. Notice About the Identity of a Creditor
The Second and Fourth Circuits have split about the need for a plaintiff
to prove that material harm arose from the mistaken identification of a
creditor under similar provisions in the FCRA and the FDCPA. The Fourth
Circuit denied standing under the FCRA for misidentification of a creditor
because it found that the misidentification caused the plaintiff no material,
real-world harm.242
In contrast, the Second Circuit found standing under the FDCPA for
“allegedly incorrect identification of . . . the creditor in the foreclosure
complaint” because that misidentification “might have . . . pos[ed] a ‘risk of
real harm’” to the plaintiff.243 Highlighting its divergence from the Fourth
Circuit’s approach, the Second Circuit expressly refused to consider, as a
matter of standing, the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff did not suffer
any risk of concrete injury because he “failed to demonstrate any injury that
could have possibly resulted” from the “misidentification” because it was
239. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2018),
vacated, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
240. Id. at 1210 (quoting In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016)).
241. Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 106, 112–18 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)). The court stated that it would not address an alternative basis for
concrete injury held sufficient in Muransky, which had found that the burden of keeping or
destroying the receipt to avoid having the information fall into the hands of a third party was
a concrete injury affording standing. Id. at 118 n.10.
242. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2017).
243. Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki, & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2018).
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“too ‘trivial’ to cause harm.”244 The court held that the materiality of harm
arising from the misidentification was a merits issue that was irrelevant to
standing.245 Again, the courts split on whether Congress’s grant of a
procedural, statutory right to protect a class of consumers was sufficient to
infer a sufficient risk of injury, or whether the plaintiff needed to
demonstrate individualized risk of harm.
5. Recording the Satisfaction of a Mortgage
In an intra-circuit dispute, the Eleventh Circuit split on whether standing
arose from a statutory, procedural requirement that mortgage satisfaction be
timely recorded when the violation was cured before suit was filed.246 The
majority held that because suit was brought after the mortgage satisfaction
was recorded—albeit long after the law required that recording—the
plaintiff no longer faced any risk of harm and thus lacked standing.247 Judge
Martin dissented from denial of rehearing en banc, once again highlighting
the question of whether denial of a statutory, procedural right is itself harm,
and the extent to which courts should defer to congressional judgment
about the likelihood of harm.248
6. The Obligation to Provide Job Applicants a Credit Report Before
Taking Adverse Action
Yet another circuit split—again unnoticed by the cases themselves—has
arisen concerning standing under an FCRA requirement that potential
employers provide job applicants a copy of a consumer report before taking
adverse action based on such a report.249 The Third and Seventh Circuits
have found that standing exists when employers fail to provide reports
before taking adverse action, reasoning that the statutory right grants the
employee an opportunity to use the information in an attempt to influence
the employer’s decision, regardless of whether the information is
244. Id. at 82 & n.6 (quoting the brief).
245. Id.
246. Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 839 F.3d 998, 1003 (11th Cir. 2016).
247. Id.
248. Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 855 F.3d 1265, 1272–74 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Like the FCRA, the [statute at issue here]
required CitiMortgage to provide truthful information about him to the public. These statutes
were crafted in response to a real risk of harm. And [the plaintiff] alleged that he suffered
that real risk of harm as a result of CitiMortgage’s inaction that violated these statutes. In
that way he properly alleged injury-in-fact to meet Article III standing requirements.”).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (2018).
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accurate.250 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has rejected standing for such a
claim if the credit report is accurate.251 In that case, the job applicant was
rejected because his credit report showed that he had a charged-off debt
within the prior twenty-four months, making him ineligible for the
defendant’s job program.252 The court held that the applicant showed no
material risk of harm from the violation, including loss of the opportunity to
explain to the employer that he had actually incurred the debt four years
earlier than it was ultimately charged off and thus to argue that he fell
outside the eligibility bar, or to argue for an exception to the bar.253 The
court also necessarily concluded, unlike the Third and Seventh Circuits, that
the job applicant had no right to receive his credit report and use that
information in an attempt to influence the employer’s decision (or a
subsequent employer’s decision) by explaining or providing context.254
III. Understanding Procedural Standing Under Spokeo
In light of the many circuit splits that have percolated since the Supreme
Court decided Spokeo in 2016, the question of how one should make sense
of procedural standing remains. The central insight is that Congress does
not enact statutory, procedural rights that fall somewhere on a spectrum
from no risk of harm to extremely likely harm. Further, the judicial
assessment of procedural standing is not simply a matter of line-drawing
between risks that are “real” and those that are “bare.”
Instead, Congress enacts distinct categories of procedural rights, with
each category corresponding to a distinct set of underlying legislative
judgments and intentions, and thus implicating a distinct set of standing
principles. Sometimes Congress enacts a statutory enforcement right, i.e.,
250. Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (“That Robertson
has not pleaded what she may have said if given the chance to respond [to the adverse
information in the credit report], or that she may not have convinced Allied to honor its [job]
offer, is immaterial to the substance of her interest in responding.”); Long v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 319, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2018) (“§ 1681b(b)(3) confers on the individual a
right to receive, before adverse action is taken, a copy of his or her consumer report
(regardless of its accuracy) and a notice of his or her rights. This right permits individuals to
know beforehand when their consumer reports might be used against them, and creates the
possibility for the consumer to respond to inaccurate or negative information—either in the
current job application process, or going forward in other job applications.”).
251. Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173–76 (9th Cir. 2018).
252. Id. at 1170, 1176.
253. Id. at 1173–76.
254. Id. at 1175–76.
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an overt grant of a bare right to file suit for some other injury.255 Other
times, Congress creates a right the violation of which is intrinsically
injurious, meaning that Congress intends that denial of the right in-and-of
itself imposes a concrete injury.256 And still other times, Congress enacts an
instrumental statutory right that, through a chain of causation, is intended to
protect against the material risk of some other concrete harm with which
Congress is ultimately concerned.257
Spokeo specifically recognizes that “Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that . . . give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before.”258 Courts properly defer to the
legislature’s judgment in exercising those powers; doing so requires courts
to understand the different sorts of legislative judgments Congress has
made for each category of procedural right.
A. Spokeo Introduces a Third Strand of Procedural Standing: Instrumental
Rights Against Private Defendants
To understand Spokeo, it is important to look behind the Court’s
language and identify the novel strand of rights that Spokeo introduces as
subject to procedural standing. Spokeo does not concern itself with bare
procedural enforcement rights that Congress has granted to authorize suit
for an administrative agency’s alleged dereliction of its procedural,
decision-making obligation. Instead, Spokeo introduces a third set of
procedural rights into the procedural standing universe: instrumental rights
against private parties.259

255. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992) (holding that the
citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), which states that
“any person may commence a civil suit” for any violation of the Act, is a bare procedural
right and that concrete injury must otherwise be shown).
256. E.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998) (holding that
denial of information subject to mandatory disclosure under the Federal Election Campaign
Act is intrinsically concrete injury); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449
(1989) (holding that denial of information subject to mandatory disclosure under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act is intrinsically concrete injury).
257. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (holding that a “litigant to
whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,’” i.e., an
instrumental right, “can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).
258. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
259. See id. at 1549–50.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/2

2020]

PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO

571

In other words, what makes a statutory right “procedural” in the sense
advanced by Spokeo is that it is instrumental, which means it is intended to
protect some distinct interest other than the denial of the right itself.
Congress grants instrumental rights (mandating or forbidding certain
conduct by statute) not because of the harm caused by violation of that
instrumental right—violation of the instrumental right itself, with nothing
more, ordinarily causes no real-world harm—but because Congress has
concluded that granting the instrumental right serves to protect against risk
to a distinct, real-world, target harm. That is, the instrumental right is
enacted for the instrumental purpose of protecting against the concrete,
target injury.
Lujan set the stage for instrumental rights as a distinct category,
expressly distinguishing the bare procedural enforcement right Congress
had enacted in that case from circumstances in which standing would exist
when “plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the
disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs.” 260
Lujan expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, which had “held
that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional
conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental
‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law.”261
Lujan thereby laid the groundwork for recognizing instrumental rights
(expressly denominated as such) as part of the realm of procedural rights
that afford standing when it explained “that an individual can[] enforce
procedural rights . . . so long as the procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of
his standing.”262 Thus, Lujan appears to hold that an instrumental right—
unlike a bare enforcement right—suffices for standing because Congress
intends for that right to protect some distinct concrete interest. It does not
suggest any need for judicial assessment of whether the instrumental right
in question actually provided such protection in a particular case.
Spokeo, however, implicitly imports the concept of a “bare” procedural
right in the form of a procedural enforcement mechanism that is untethered
from any concrete interest, as in Lujan, and concludes that the concept
applies—at least in some circumstances—to instrumental rights.263 Spokeo
260. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517–18
(construing an instrumental right against a public agency).
261. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 573 n.8.
263. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50.
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explains that the requirement of a concrete injury “is not automatically
satisfied whenever a statute grants a statutory right and authorizes a person
to sue to vindicate that right; a plaintiff may not merely allege a ‘bare
procedural violation’ of a statute. Rather, to confer standing, the statutory
violation must be accompanied by a concrete injury.”264
That wording is entirely consistent with prior procedural standing cases,
but because Spokeo involved instrumental rather than enforcement rights,
the implication of the language is significant: instrumental rights (like
enforcement rights) may be bare, i.e., insufficiently connected to a “risk of
real harm” to afford standing, regardless of Congress’s intent to protect
concrete interests.265 Spokeo also observes, however, that “the violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances
to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need
not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”266
The central question left unresolved by Spokeo is how to harmonize the
various principles the Court has stated regarding how a court should
determine when the violation of a procedural right bestowed by Congress
presents a concrete injury without evidence of additional harm: Bare
enforcement rights never create a concrete interest that would not otherwise
exist because Congress does not have the power to abrogate the bedrock
concrete injury requirement of Article III. Denial of some procedural rights
automatically establishes a concrete injury because Congress has the power
to define intrinsically injurious rights. Denial of some instrumental rights
automatically establishes a material risk of real harm because Congress has
the power to articulate chains of causation connecting instrumental rights to
a real risk of concrete injury. Denial of other instrumental rights establishes
concrete injury, as in Spokeo, only when a violation of the right presents a
“risk of real harm.” How are courts to reconcile these principles in a
particular case, and in doing so, what level of deference should be accorded
to Congress?

264. The Supreme Court, 2015 Term, Justiciability—Class Action Standing—Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 130 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (citing Spokeo, 136
S. Ct. at 1549).
265. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
266. Id. at 1549–50 (citing Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998);
Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)).
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B. Congress Enacts Procedural Rights for Multiple, Distinct Reasons
Corresponding to Multiple, Distinct Categories of Procedural Standing
Why does Congress enact procedural rights? It does so for four distinct
reasons: (1) to authorize suit; (2) to define and thereby protect an intangible
right; (3) to mandate a decision-making process; or (4) for the category of
procedural rights at issue in Spokeo, to grant an instrumental right for the
purpose of protecting a distinct, concrete interest.
And why does Congress grant an instrumental right rather than directly
protect the target, concrete interest? It does so for one of two reasons:
(1) because it concludes that it may be unduly difficult to prove the
existence or extent of injury to that target interest, or to prove the likelihood
of risk of future injury; or (2) because it believes the instrumental right is a
necessary and proper means of prophylactically preventing members of a
group from suffering the target injury, rather than simply affording
compensation for the subset of group members who file suit and are able to
prove the target injury has occurred.267
The first of Congress’s four reasons for enacting procedural rights is that
it sometimes wishes to create an enforcement right, i.e., to grant a private
cause of action to enforce some other right. When that other right is also
procedural, as under Lujan, standing turns on whether that other right
affords standing by implicating a particularized and concrete injury.268
Second, Congress sometimes enacts a right that, though intangible, is
granted for its own sake—i.e., though it may not be obvious, the intangible
right is what would traditionally be understood as a substantive right. It is
not, at least primarily, intended to be instrumentally useful in protecting
some other right. Instead, it is granted for its own sake, given congressional
judgment that violation of the right itself intrinsically constitutes real-world,
concrete injury.
Third, Congress sometimes enacts a right that requires a defendant—an
executive agency or, post-Spokeo, a private party—to engage in a specified
decision-making process before it acts.269 In some sense, Congress is
motivated by the belief that a better process is likely to result in a
substantively wiser eventual decision. But Congress also grants such
267. See id. at 1549–50; cf. Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 128, at 59.
268. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992).
269. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348–50
(1989) (considering injury from violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
which requires agencies to draft Environmental Impact Statements).
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procedural, decision-making rights because those rights are valuable, in and
of themselves. Congress grants those with a concrete interest in the subject
matter of the decision a right to attempt to influence the decision-making
process, or to have the decision-maker consider specified factors before
making the decision.270 Denial of the mandated process thus creates an
injury that is not contingent on the likelihood that a valid process would
result in a more favorable decision.271
And finally, as with the rights at issue in Spokeo, Congress sometimes
enacts an instrumental right. That is, Congress enacts instrumental rights
mandating or forbidding particular conduct not because that conduct is
intrinsically harmful, but because Congress believes protecting the
instrumental right is necessary and proper to further protect a distinct, realworld interest.
With such instrumental rights, Congress enacts the instrumental right
rather than direct protection of the target right because it has made a
categorical judgment that the target harm or risk of harm to members of the
protected group is some combination of likely, difficult to prove, or
prophylactically useful in avoiding the target harm. Based on this
congressional judgment, the violation of such an instrumental right should
result in an automatic judicial finding of real-world harm to the target
interest.272
With other instrumental rights, Congress believes such real-world harm
may well occur as a result of a violation of the instrumental right, but it has
not made that categorical judgment, and it does not intend for that
conclusion to be automatic for a reviewing court. Such a conclusion is only
presumptive, and a reviewing court must determine whether the particular
plaintiff was harmed or subjected to a risk of real harm by violation of such
instrumental rights.273
C. Judicial Deference to Congressional Judgment
When Congress makes legislative judgments in the course of enacting
procedural rights, courts should defer to those judgments in determining
standing. Courts should not defer blindly but should recognize
congressional power to define injuries for intrinsically injurious rights, and
to articulate chains of causation between instrumental rights and the
270.
271.
272.
273.

See id. at 350 n.13.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 & n.7.
See infra Section IV.C.1.
See infra Section IV.C.2.
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concrete, target harms they are intended to prevent.274 “[E]valuating the
gravity of injury and its connection to statutory violation involves both
findings of legislative fact, at which Congress is more adept than courts,
and determining the desirability of value-laden trade-offs, which must rely
on the democratic accountability of Congress.”275
Historically, the judiciary has so deferred. “When a plaintiff relies on a
statute as the basis for its standing claim, the Court has consistently
resolved the standing issue in accordance with its interpretation of
congressional intent.”276 As the Court has recognized:
The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate
forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the
kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts,
therefore, will overturn a legislative determination of a factual
question only if the legislature’s finding is so clearly wrong that
it may be characterized as “arbitrary,” “irrational,” or
“unreasonable.” Limitations stemming from the nature of the
judicial process, however, have no application to Congress.277
274. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
275. Mark Seidenfeld & Allie Akre, Standing in the Wake of Statutes, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
745, 752 (2015); see also William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 279–80 (2001) (“From a comparative institutional analysis
perspective, courts are simply unsuited to evaluate independently either general legislative
judgments about statutory goals and process or the significance of particular legal breaches
and associated litigation.”).
276. Pierce, supra note 17, at 1192 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
347 (1984); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372–79 (1982); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 75–77 (1978); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208–11 (1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153–58 (1970); FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940)); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 637–38 (1999) (“[As to] information, and perhaps more
generally, the Court has rooted the standing question firmly in Congress’s instructions.
Whether a plaintiff has standing depends on what the relevant statute says. For . . . ‘injury in
fact’ . . . the foundation for the Court’s conclusion is that Congress created a legally
cognizable injury and gave citizens the right to redress that injury in court.”).
277. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247–48 (1970) (citation omitted) (citing
Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 94–95
(1961); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1938); Metro. Cas. Ins.
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Judicial respect for the separation of powers, and for the legislature’s
power to make law and to determine complex factual questions, includes
respecting Congress’s judgment underlying the procedural rights it enacts.
Thus, when Congress makes a judgment that a right is intrinsically
injurious, such that its violation constitutes injury in fact, that judgment
should be respected. Moreover, when Congress articulates a chain of
causation between an instrumental right and the target right it is intended to
protect, courts should defer to that congressional judgment, whether it is
categorical or presumptive.
IV. The Categories of Statutory, Procedural Rights
Recall that Chief Justice Roberts, at oral argument for First American,
asked plaintiff’s counsel to clarify his argument concerning injury-in-fact.
He highlighted three possible arguments: (1) that there was an injury in fact
in the case, (2) Congress’s creation of the statute should be construed as a
presumption of injury in fact, or (3) an injury in fact is not required and the
procedural violation alone is sufficient.278
The answer to which of the three arguments is correct is: It depends,
because determination of injury-in-fact depends on the category of
procedural right Congress intended to enact. Congress sometimes intends to
enact intangible statutory rights for which injury-in-fact beyond the
statutory violation is not required; sometimes, it intends to enact
instrumental rights for which injury-in-fact is to be automatically presumed;
and sometimes, it intends to enact instrumental rights for which material
risk of injury-in-fact is presumptively present, but must be demonstrated in
each particular case.
When Congress enacts a procedural statutory right, it does not have a
monolithic intent to enact a single type of statutory right. Not all procedural
rights are subject to a single, over-arching test for procedural standing
which courts use to divide statutory rights into two piles, bare rights and
rights involving at least a risk of real harm.279 Instead, Congress enacts
Co. of N.Y. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583–84 (1935)); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality) (“[C]ourts must accord substantial deference to
the predictive judgments of Congress.”).
278. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 177, at 32.
279. See Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Spokeo
categorized statutory violations as falling into two broad categories: (1) where the violation
of a procedural right granted by statute is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete
injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s
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procedural rights that fit into distinct categories, each with a different nexus
between the procedural right and the concrete interest with which Congress
is ultimately concerned. Congress enacts procedural rights for distinct
reasons—and with different intended connections between the statutory
provision and the concrete harm that Congress ultimately wishes to protect.
In order to protect the separation of powers between the branches, the
judicial branch must actually consider the particular nature of the power
that Congress intended to exercise and defer to “Congress[’s] . . . power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that . . . give rise to a case
or controversy where none existed before.”280
This recognition leads to a fundamental principle of procedural standing:
When a court assesses the existence of procedural standing, its task is not to
engage in some over-arching, trans-procedural assessment of concrete
injury, risk of real harm, bareness of procedure, or any additional facts
concerning concrete harm alleged beyond the statutory violation itself. The
first step in analyzing procedural standing requires the court to determine
the category of procedural right that Congress intended to enact. The
second step requires the court to determine, deferentially, whether
Congress’s judgment reflected in that decision is so arbitrary, irrational, or
unreasonable that it must be rejected. Procedural standing is warranted
unless Congress intended to direct the court to issue an advisory opinion,
enforce a generalized right to proper administration of the law, or enforce
an instrumental procedural right that (at the time of violation) had no
material connection to any risk of actual, concrete harm.
On, then, to a typology of procedural rights. Statutory procedural rights
fall into three categories: enforcement, intrinsically injurious, and
instrumental. The first category—enforcement rights—is straightforward: it
includes provisions in which Congress expressly provides a cause of action,
stating that a claim may be brought. These rights are procedural in the sense
that they relate to the conduct of litigation rather than regulating real-world
conduct.
The second category—intrinsically injurious rights—includes those
intangible rights the denial of which Congress in and of itself intends to
concrete interests and the procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to that
concrete interest; and (2) where there is a ‘bare’ procedural violation that does not meet this
standard, in which case a plaintiff must allege ‘additional harm beyond the one Congress has
identified.’”) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
280. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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constitute injury-in-fact; the right is not aimed at protection of some other,
ultimate harm. In contrast, the third category—instrumental rights—are
those rights Congress enacts to protect some other distinct target interest
that would likely be materially affected by a violation, rather than Congress
being concerned with violation of the instrumental right in and of itself.
Spokeo brings these instrumental rights into the procedural standing
pantheon, as against private parties.
A crucial, practical dividing line exists between those procedural rights
that do not require a plaintiff to demonstrate some additional harm or risk
of real harm beyond denial of the statutory right itself and those that do. All
intrinsically injurious rights fit into the former category, as one may
imagine—whether that right is intangible or is a decision-making or
dignitary right like that at issue in Lujan.
Not so obviously, but of vital importance, one sub-type of instrumental
rights also fits into this category. Such rights, which this Article terms
instrumental automatically injurious rights, are those rights that Congress
enacts for the purpose of preventing some distinct target harm, intending
that a statutory violation automatically result in standing.281 Congress
intends this outcome because it concluded that a violation of the
instrumental right in question categorically results in a chain of causation
that gives rise to a risk of real harm to the protected class that would be
difficult to prove.
Another sub-type of instrumental rights is instrumental presumptively
injurious rights.282 For these rights, Congress presumes that standing is
appropriate but intends for courts to exercise judicial scrutiny to determine
whether the statutory violation resulted in a risk of the real harm with which
Congress was ultimately concerned for the particular plaintiff.283
A. Enforcement Rights
The first category of procedural rights is enforcement rights. These are
the traditional “bare” procedural rights, or procedural rights “in vacuo,”
recognized in Lujan and Spokeo.284 Because this category of procedural
281. See infra Section IV.C.1.
282. See infra Section IV.C.2.
283. Such harm or risk of harm is often an element of the violation itself, but even if it is
not, it remains a matter of procedural standing.
284. See, e.g., Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting the enforcement right for willful
violation of the FCRA); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72 (quoting “[t]he so-called ‘citizen-suit’”
provision of the Endangered Species Act as the enforcement right).
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right only represents congressional intent to afford a cause of action for
enforcing some other right (in the context of procedural standing, some
other procedural right) it cannot itself confer standing, absent a risk of
concrete injury from denial of that other right.
But the existence of such an enforcement right is still relevant,
notwithstanding its inability to confer standing. Congress’s decision to
grant such an enforcement right demonstrates its belief that standing is
proper. That belief, while not dispositive, tilts the scale toward a finding
that standing is proper when courts afford deference to this congressional
intent while conducting the standing analysis.285
B. Intrinsically Injurious Rights
The second category of procedural rights is intrinsically injurious rights,
i.e., those rights that, when denied, automatically result in concrete injury
(and thus standing). The two sub-types are intrinsically injurious intangible
rights, i.e., rights that in and of themselves provide a benefit that is
concrete, though intangible, and intrinsically injurious decision-making or
dignitary rights, i.e., rights that provide a remedy for harm resulting from
denial of an entitlement to participation in and opportunity to attempt to
influence a decision-making process.
1. Intrinsically Injurious Intangible Rights
The first sub-type of intrinsically injurious right is intrinsically injurious
intangible rights, which are intangible rights granted for their own sake
because the denial of such rights constitutes concrete injury. Because
Congress has, in these instances, created a legal right the denial of which in
and of itself constitutes injury, evidence of additional harm is not only
unnecessary but also irrelevant.286
It is useful to recognize that these rights, while intangible, are not really
procedural in any meaningful sense. They are raised here because Spokeo’s
discussion of standing blurs the distinction between procedural and
285. The existence of an enforcement right to sue must be distinguished from the
ultimate legal viability of the claim. The existence of a sufficient “legal interest” as a
threshold matter of standing is limited to determining if the federal “claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946); see also Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974) (holding that
standing is precluded only if a claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior
decisions of [the Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve
a federal controversy”).
286. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
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intangible rights when it begins its discussion of procedural standing by
pointing to free speech and free exercise rights as “intangible injuries [that]
can nevertheless be concrete.”287 Moreover, courts of appeals consistently
analyze the existence of standing for such rights by applying Spokeo,
without appreciating the distinction between intrinsically and
instrumentally injurious rights.288
There is also a practical reason for discussing this category of rights in
the course of delineating procedural standing: It is not always obvious
whether Congress intended a right to be intrinsically or instrumentally
injurious.289 Thus, drawing lines between intangible intrinsically injurious
rights and instrumental rights is necessary, and accurate line-drawing
requires an understanding of what lies on either side.
Spokeo recognizes this category when it quotes Lujan’s observation that
“Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’”290 In
other words, this category covers interests that are already (intrinsically)
concrete, prior to and independent of Congress’s decision to statutorily
grant a right protecting that interest; Congress has simply created a legal
right, defining what would already be a de facto injury as a legal injury. But
sometimes, if there would otherwise be doubt as to whether an injury is
concrete, Congress’s power to exercise its judgment in defining the injury
as a legal right warrants judicial deference.
287. Id.
288. Cf. Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 727 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016)
(concluding that the characterization of a right as substantive or procedural is irrelevant
under Spokeo because both require injury-in-fact—though not recognizing that a statutory
violation can be intrinsically injurious and thereby constitute injury-in-fact).
289. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998) (exemplifying
the difficulty in distinguishing whether a right is intrinsically or instrumentally injurious due
to the lack of clarity about Congress’s intent in granting the statutory right to receive the
information at issue). Congress might plausibly have granted the right at issue: (1) because
the information was itself intrinsically valuable, (2) because Congress concluded the
information would as a general matter be instrumentally useful to the class of recipients
statutorily entitled to that information, who could reasonably be expected to use it to further
the distinct, concrete interests in lobbying and in influencing elections, or (3) because
Congress thought the information likely instrumentally useful to each recipient (thus
requiring each recipient to prove that its denial as to them would cause a risk of harm). Id.
Spokeo rejected the third possibility and suggested the second to be correct. Spokeo, 136 S.
Ct. at 1549.
290. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578
(1992)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/2

2020]

PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO

581

Intrinsically injurious intangible rights parallel common law rights, such
as trespass and breach of contract, for which violation of the right is itself
injurious. A plaintiff can bring suit for trespass or breach of contract and
recover nominal damages, even absent any proof, evidence, or possibility of
concrete harm arising from the violation.291 Courts have been in widespread
agreement—applying the rubric of Spokeo—that unsolicited telemarketing,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TPCA),292
affords procedural standing, even absent any proof of harm beyond the fact
that an unauthorized call, fax or text was placed.293
The TCPA makes it unlawful “for any person within the United
States . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other
device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited
advertisement.”294 The Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA conferred standing
to sue when a plaintiff received an unsolicited text message
advertisement.295 The court pointed to the history of “[a]ctions to
remedy . . . invasions of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance”
and congressional findings that unwelcome telemarketing can invade
privacy.296 As the court explained, “Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls
or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude
of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA ‘need
not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’”297
291. See Hessick, supra note 32, at 281–86; 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 56, at 149 (2d ed. 2011) (trespass actionable for nominal damages, even absent injury);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (nominal damages
for breach of contract); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §1
cmt. a, § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (restitution is permissible in the absence of, or
beyond the scope of, provable loss).
292. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-73).
293. See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (9th
Cir. 2017).
294. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1)(C).
295. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042–43.
296. Id. at 1043.
297. Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)); accord Melito v.
Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88–95 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that standing exists
for TCPA claim alleging unsolicited text messages); Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925
F.3d 643, 649–54 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding the sales agents calls were equivalent to
unsolicited phone calls); Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348–51 (3d Cir.
2017) (same as to single unsolicited phone call); see also Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
136 S. Ct. 663, 669–72 (2016) (finding a TCPA class action justiciable, four months before
Spokeo).
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In other words, the receipt of an unsolicited advertisement via telephone,
fax machine, computer, or cellphone is intrinsically injurious; no further
harm or risk of harm need be shown.
Some courts have also found violation of rights that prohibit the
collection or dissemination of private information to be intrinsically
injurious, looking to both history and congressional intent to determine that
the legislatively forbidden intrusion was itself injurious, regardless of any
additional risk or loss.298 History is particularly relevant in determining the
existence of an intrinsically injurious intangible right because the existence
of a historical analog, either common-law or statutory, that was regularly
brought without evidence of harm beyond the violation itself provides
compelling evidence that Congress intended for a similar right to be
considered intrinsically injurious.
2. Intrinsically Injurious Decision-Making and Dignitary Rights
The second sub-type of intrinsically injurious rights is intrinsically
injurious decision-making and dignitary rights, which are the sort of rights
at issue imposed on agencies in traditional procedural standing cases.299
One form of such rights is when Congress mandates that an agency or a
private defendant employ a particular decision-making process, e.g., that it
must decide particular issues when a triggering event occurs, or that it must
consider certain data or issue a report on particular issues before making a
decision. Another form is when Congress mandates that those with a
298. See, e.g., Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that disclosure of personal identity and viewing history under Video Privacy
Protection Act was concrete injury, even absent “additional consequences”); Heglund v.
Aitkin Cty., 871 F.3d 572, 577–78 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that unlawful accessing of
private driver’s license information under Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, affording
standing, regardless of further harm, because it was not a bare procedural violation under
Spokeo); In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 271–74 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that Viacom’s
and Google’s collection and disclosure of internet users’ personal information, such as
websites visited and videos viewed, afforded standing, given “Congress’s judgment [that the
information] ought to remain private,” and that “Spokeo . . . does not alter our prior analysis
in Google”); In re Google, Inc., 806 F.3d 125, 133–35 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that
placement of cookies on users’ computers violated various state and federal statutes,
including the Stored Communications Act, giving rise to standing even if the users had not
suffered any resulting economic loss).
299. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (“[A] litigant to whom
Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992)).
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concrete interest in the outcome of a decision be afforded an opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process. Such participatory rights are
granted because of the dignitary value thereby provided, guaranteeing
access and an opportunity to attempt to influence the ultimate decision,
regardless of any evidence providing a basis to believe that the interested
party’s participation is likely to alter that decision.
When Congress grants such decision-making rights, part of its
motivation is a general desire to advance the substantive wisdom of the
ultimate decision to be made. But part of the motivation is also to create a
fair process, independent of the outcome. Congress thus employs the
mechanism of granting those with a personal interest in the outcome of the
decision an enforceable right to insist that the defendant employ the
required decision-making process, without requiring proof that compliance
with that process would have resulted in a different, more favorable
outcome. Similarly, when Congress grants a participatory right to someone
with a concrete stake—a guaranteed opportunity to influence a decision by
participating in the process—denial of the mandated process necessarily
causes injury to the party in question, without proof or evidence that the
exclusion caused additional harm by altering the decision that would have
been made.300
These decision-making rights include the procedural rights discussed in
cases like Lujan: obligations on agencies to issue a decision in defined
circumstances, or to consider particular evidence in reaching a decision.301
They include agency obligations, under statutes like NEPA, to issue an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before making a decision
constituting a “major Federal action.”302 The agency is substantively free to
take any action, regardless of any environmental impact it recognizes in the
EIS, but the failure to issue an EIS bars the agency from taking action.303
As Justice Scalia explained in Lujan, plaintiffs who are geographically
proximate to areas affected by an environmental decision who have been
denied such a decision-making right need not prove that, if they had been
afforded the right, the ultimate decision would have been different or the
potential consequence imminent; rather, denial of the decision-making right
300. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 174 n.21 (explaining that with decision-making
rights, “the plaintiff is entitled to the process whether or not it will make any difference in
the real world”); accord Burt, supra note 9, at 295–97.
301. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–70.
302. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1989).
303. Id.
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is itself enough to afford standing, regardless of any additional risk of
harm.304 As the Court recognized as early as 1997, “It is rudimentary
administrative law that discretion as to the substance of the ultimate
decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required procedures of
decisionmaking.”305
This sub-type of rights parallels the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
intrinsic value of procedural due process. The Court held in Carey v. Piphus
that suit may be brought and nominal damages recovered for violation of
the procedural due process right to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing,
even if it is proven that provision of such a process would not have changed
the resulting decision.306 The Carey Court declined to authorize actual
damages for a public school’s denial of plaintiff’s participatory decisionmaking right absent proof that the mandated process would have changed
the outcome of the decision or that emotional damages arose from the
denial.307 But the Court permitted recovery of nominal damages, even
without proof of such additional harm—thus necessarily, if implicitly,
finding standing to bring suit—because denial of the mandated process was
itself an injury-in-fact.308
This type of dignitary, decision-making right also helps explain the
Supreme Court’s recognition of standing in cases challenging affirmative
action in contracting and university admissions. The Court has held that
being subject to an unfair decision-making process affords standing, even if
it is proven that the proper process would not have altered the decision:
“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’ The aggrieved
party ‘need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the
barrier in order to establish standing.’”309
Whatever one thinks of the Court’s solicitude for the dignitary injuries of
white plaintiffs challenging affirmative action policies in programs for
which they had no chance of admission even absent affirmative action, the
principle is the same as that at issue in procedural standing: Certain
304. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7, 573 n.8.
305. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997).
306. 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978).
307. Id. at 259–64.
308. Id. at 266–67.
309. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (citation omitted)
(quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656, 666–67 (1993)).
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decision-making rights are so fundamental that their denial works a
dignitary injury, regardless of additional harm.
Intrinsically injurious decision-making and participatory rights exist
when a procedure itself constitutes the guaranteed right that Congress
intends to protect. Just as procedural due process guarantees notice and an
opportunity to be heard, regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove any
possibility of a different result if such procedural rights were provided,
these rights reflect the value and importance of a fair process, independent
of the substantive outcome. Such rights include the guarantee of an
opportunity to attempt to convince a decision-maker—a core procedural
value—through a combination of a dignitary right in the person and the
institutional integrity of the decision-making entity.
The determination of whether a procedural right is an intrinsically
injurious decision-making or dignitary right, as opposed to an instrumental
right focused on the potential effect on the outcome of the decision, is
analogous to the determination of structural error at trial. For intrinsically
injurious rights, the nature of the flaw is sufficiently serious that any
asserted harmless error is either unduly difficult to determine or irrelevant
given the gravity of the denial. Overwhelming evidence of a criminal
defendant’s guilt can never justify the denial of a jury, or the use of a jury
that was selected through a racially biased process.310 But a right’s
relationship to a decision-making process does not necessarily make it
intrinsically injurious; the question is whether Congress intended to confer
the sort of decision-making, participatory, or dignitary right such that the
denial itself causes injury.
Spokeo’s extension of procedural standing to claims against private
parties strongly suggests that when Congress has enacted a statutory
obligation that fundamentally constrains a private party’s decision-making
process, the same principles applicable to an agency’s decision-making
obligations also apply. When a plaintiff alleges that a private party has
failed to comply with a mandated decision-making process, or to afford
interested plaintiffs a right of participation that respects their dignity and
provides them an opportunity to attempt to influence the decision, that
violation is itself sufficient for standing: The plaintiff need not prove that
compliance with the decision-making obligation would have been likely to
change the decision.
310. In contrast, the denial of an instrumental presumptively injurious right is precisely
of the sort subject to harmless error analysis. See infra Section IV.C.2.
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Courts and scholars have frequently noted the existence of such
dignitary, procedural rights concerning decision-making processes. As
Professor Robert Bone has noted, “[S]ome scholars argue that a right to
participate is required to respect the dignity of those who are bound or
otherwise seriously affected by a decision.”311 Respect for the dignity of
those deeply affected by a substantive decision justifies, for example, the
rights of absent class members. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
grants an absolute right of notice and participation to absent class members
in a class proceeding that will bind them as to individualized damages,
regardless of whether there is any reason to believe that such a right is
pragmatically useful, or even when such a right is harmful to the interests of
those absent class members.312 Such rights are justified because
“participation in regulatory problem solving by interested and affected
parties has an independent, democratic value.”313
Professor William Buzbee argues that at least some of these constraints
on agency decision-making should be understood as substantive rather than
procedural violations, thus justifying standing.314 In arguing that the denial
is substantive, what he apparently means is that the violation is intrinsically
injurious, regardless of proof of additional harm; the distinction is largely
semantic, but the argument he makes, echoed in this Article, is that some
intrinsically injurious rights arise from mandated decision-making
procedures. The essential point is that certain decision-making rights, often
labeled procedural because they concern the decision-making process, are

311. Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1027
(2010) (citing JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253
(1985)).
312. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115
MICH. L. REV. 171, 183–84 (2016).
313. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 27 (1997). Similarly, Professor Solum points to a model of procedural justice that
“connects the independent value of process with the dignity of those who are affected by
legal proceedings. . . . This right to participation is justified by a background right of
political morality, that is, the right of persons . . . to be treated with dignity and respect.”
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 262–63 & n.208 (2004)
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 259 & n.201 (“The participation model holds that
procedural fairness requires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in
the process by which the decision is made.”).
314. William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and
Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 793 n.148
(1997).
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so fundamental that their denial itself creates an injury-in-fact, regardless of
any effect on the resulting decision.315
Perhaps best exemplifying this category of rights is the circuit split as to
standing under the FCRA for an employer’s failure to provide job
applicants with a copy of a consumer report before taking adverse action
based on that report.316 The Third and Seventh Circuits, which found
standing based on the applicant’s guaranteed procedural right to use the
report to have an opportunity to influence the employer’s decision317 have
the better of the arguments here. The right at issue is an intrinsically
injurious decision-making right guaranteeing participation in the decisionmaking process and access to information to craft an argument in an
attempt to influence the employer’s decision, without any need for proof of
likely success. As the Seventh Circuit explained, “Article III’s strictures are
met not only when a plaintiff complains of being deprived of some benefit,
but also when a plaintiff complains that she was deprived of a chance to
obtain a benefit.”318

315. See Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 17, at 203. “Procedural fairness . . . is not
subsumed completely by substantive justice. Procedural fairness means that a legitimate
decisionmaking process promotes independent values of participation, deliberation, and
consensus.” Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1489 (1991) (“The decisionmaking enterprise can be empowering where it gives
participants a stake in the outcome because it promotes both a sense of collective
responsibility for the outcome and an individual opportunity to succeed a fair proportion of
the time.”). Thus, “[i]f process is constitutionally valued . . . it must be valued not only as a
means to some independent end, but for its intrinsic characteristics: being heard is part of
what it means to be a person. Process itself, therefore, becomes substantive.” Laurence H.
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1070–71 (1980) (footnote omitted).
316. See supra Section II.B.6.
317. See Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 695–97 (7th Cir. 2018); Long v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 321–23 (3d Cir. 2018).
318. Robertson, 902 F.3d at 697 (citing Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct.
973, 983 (2017); Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). The Ninth Circuit decision rejecting standing on this claim seems
particularly misguided; the information in that particular credit report was technically
accurate, but the plaintiff had an entirely reasonable explanation for why it was not as
troubling as it seemed, in that the potentially concerning conduct of not paying a debt had
occurred four years earlier than the report implied; thus the legislative purpose would have
been particularly well-served by affording the employee an opportunity to explain why the
debt should not have been disqualifying. See Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895
F.3d 1166, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2018).
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C. Instrumental Procedural Rights
The third category of procedural rights—instrumental rights, including
those against private parties—were referenced in Lujan and overtly
incorporated into the procedural standing universe in Spokeo. An
instrumental right is one that Congress enacts for the purpose of protecting
against some other distinct harm, rather than for its own sake; the
instrumental right is granted only because of the risk of harm its denial
presents to the distinct (concrete) target harm that Congress is actually
intending to prevent.
For example, the obligation to provide notice of some other right or duty
is always instrumental; Congress is not directly concerned with the act of
notice itself, but notice serves to protect the other right or duty about which
Congress is ultimately concerned. Also instrumental is the right at issue in
Spokeo, credit reporting agencies’ obligation to employ reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information in
credit reports. Consumers do not have a concrete interest in credit reporting
agency’s procedures in and of themselves; nor do they have a concrete
interest in agencies’ following the law, and Congress had no reason to
confer such a right for its own sake. Instead, Congress believed the
obligation to have reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy to be instrumentally useful to protect consumers against the
distinct, concrete injury of errors in credit reports that posed a risk of realworld harm.319
1. Instrumental Automatically Injurious Rights
The first sub-type of instrumental right is the instrumental automatically
injurious right. These rights, though instrumental, are intended by Congress
to automatically confer standing whenever they are denied. The rights
themselves are not intrinsically injurious; no concrete harm arises directly
from their denial. Rather, Congress has concluded that a violation of the
instrumental right creates a categorical, material risk of harm to the
concrete, target right with which Congress is ultimately concerned. That
categorical risk of harm to the class of people protected by the right, at the
time of violation, justifies automatically conferring standing for a violation
of the instrumental right.
These rights (along with intrinsically injurious rights) are within the
category Spokeo refers to when it states that “the violation of a procedural
319. See infra Section IV.C.2.
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right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to
constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”320 If
Congress intends for the violation of an instrumental right to automatically
establish standing, based on the categorical risk of a difficult-to-prove real
harm that it determined was materially likely to arise from the statutory
violation, then the court’s task is simply to assess the propriety of that
conclusion, with due deference to Congress.
This category parallels the common law torts of libel and slander per se.
As Spokeo observes, “[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort
victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”321 Unlike
trespass or breach of contract, the violation itself does not cause intrinsic
injury; rather, the general difficulty of proving and measuring the harm that
is likely to arise from the violation justifies recovery (and thus, plainly,
authorizes suit), even absent evidence of such harm or risk of harm in a
particular case.
As Spokeo explains, “Just as the common law permitted suit in such
instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. . . . [A]
plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified.”322 For example, Spokeo explains, Congress
decided that it was useful to enact rights to receive information in various
statutes that Spokeo specifically denominates as “procedural”; these rights
require that, in defined circumstances, certain information be provided
because Congress has concluded that such information is useful to the class
of people who are statutorily entitled to receive it.323 Spokeo continues, the
320. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016) (citing Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 449 (1989)).
321. Id. at 1549 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 569, 570 (AM. LAW INST.
1938) (libel and slander per se, respectively)).
322. Id. at 1549–50 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25; Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449).
323. Akins involved mandated provision of information under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, and Public Citizen under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Id. at
1549–50. Though the Court did not mention it, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is
similar: someone entitled to information under FOIA need not prove concrete injury arising
from denial of the information sought; Congress has concluded that the information is
sufficiently likely to be useful that its denial automatically presents a material risk of harm.
Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 (“As when an agency denies requests for information under the
Freedom of Information Act, refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA Committee's
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“‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to make public
is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III,” without any need for the
plaintiff to prove that denial of the information caused any further injury.324
Again, Congress has not concluded that the information is of intrinsic
value to everyone; instead, it enacts the instrumental right to access the
information in order to further the distinct interest in recipients’ use of the
information to “participate more effectively in the judicial selection
process,”325 or “to evaluate candidates for public office.”326 Impairment of
the target interest is the concrete injury. But Congress has enacted the
instrumental right and made the judgment that denial of that instrumental
rights suffices for standing.
As the Court explained in Public Citizen, when an agency refuses to
provide information that must be disclosed under FOIA, that denial
“constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue,” and
plaintiffs need not “show more than that they sought and were denied
specific agency records.”327 History and congressional judgment thus show
that it is permissible for Congress to enact an instrumental right that
automatically confers standing when violated, if Congress determines that a
material risk of harm arises from that violation; Article III does not mandate
that each plaintiff be able to prove that the harm or risk of harm to the target
interest actually manifested itself.328
activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide
standing to sue.”).
324. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (discussing Akins).
325. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449.
326. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21.
327. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449. A similar principle applies with copyright. “Even for
uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it deems it just, impose
a liability within statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy.” F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
328. Even as to instrumental automatically injurious rights, courts properly deny standing
if, at the time of violation, the circumstances are such that it was impossible for the
procedural right to be of benefit to the plaintiff, i.e., that the plaintiff was not in the class of
people Congress intended to protect by enacting the statutory right. For example, as the
Second Circuit held in Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2016),
standing does not exist for failure to provide notice of a right concerning a service the
defendant did not offer and which there was no plausible basis to believe it might later offer.
The question is whether, affording deference to congressional judgment, there was a material
risk of harm that arose from the violation. If the defendant did not offer a service, or the
plaintiff was definitively ineligible for the service, then there is no risk of real harm.
Congress’s judgment covers the likely consequences of the statutory violation for those who
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2. Instrumental Presumptively Injurious Rights
The next sub-type of instrumental right is the instrumental presumptively
injurious right. For such rights, Congress has concluded that a violation of
the instrumental right has a material possibly of resulting in harm to a
distinct, concrete interest, but it does not intend for that judgment to be
categorical such that violation of the instrumental right is itself
automatically sufficient to confer standing. Instead, Congress has concluded
that a violation of the instrumental right will often—and in the ordinary
case does—cause harm or a material risk of harm to the target interest, but
the difficulties of proof and risk of harm are not so great as to warrant
automatic standing from denial of the statutory right alone.329
For these rights, a court properly considers not only violation of the
instrumental statutory right, but also whether the facts at issue suggest a
past, present, or future harm or risk of harm to the target concrete interest
with which Congress is ultimately concerned. Of vital importance is that
assessment of the risk of real harm is satisfied if that risk existed at any
point—most notably, if risk of harm existed at the time of the violation,
thereby ensuring that the procedural right is not bare or in vacuo, i.e., with
no meaningful risk that it will materialize into a real-world harm.330
Congress has the power to enact procedural, instrumental rights it
considers necessary and proper to protect against material risk of concrete
injury. As the historical examples of libel, slander, unjust enrichment, and
intellectual property demonstrate, Article III standing requires no more than
that the plaintiff face a material risk of concrete injury arising from
violation of the procedural right that Congress has granted. Judicial
judgment about the existence of material risk—either automatic or
might conceivably be subject to the target injury, at the time of violation; Congress made no
judgment warranting deference about whether a defendant offered or a plaintiff was eligible
for a particular service.
329. Often, with presumptively injurious rights, Congress will confer the enforcement
right to sue only on those who are harmed or “aggrieved” by violation of the instrumental
right. In such cases, “statutory standing” is coextensive with Article III standing.
330. See, e.g., Strubel, 842 F.3d at 189 (“[T]o determine whether a procedural violation
manifests injury in fact, a court properly considers whether Congress conferred the
procedural right in order to protect an individual’s concrete interests. ‘[D]eprivation of a
procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a
procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.’”) (quoting Summers
v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1548–50 (2016) (“This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the
requirement of concreteness.”).
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presumptive—is guided by deference to congressional judgment about the
“chains of causation”331 between violations of the instrumental right and the
target harm.
For instrumental automatically injurious rights, Congress intends for
courts to hear cases based on the statutory violation alone. The judicial role
in assessing standing is to review, deferentially, Congress’s judgment that a
risk of injury to the ultimate concrete interest generally arises, at the time
that the instrumental right is violated, to those granted a right to sue, and
that difficulties of proof justify automatic standing. For instrumental
presumptively injurious rights, in contrast, Congress intends for courts to
consider the facts of the actual case to see if the particular circumstances
show that the violation resulted in harm or risk of real harm, at the time of
violation (or thereafter).
Most obviously within this presumptively injurious category is the
violation in Spokeo itself: the duty for credit reporting agencies to “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of consumer
reports.332 This mandate is instrumental because Congress is not concerned
with—and did not intend to grant consumers a right to challenge—credit
reporting agencies’ abstract, sub-standard procedures.333 It intended to enact
an instrumental presumptively injurious right that would reserve to a
reviewing court the question whether the procedural shortcoming that
would ordinarily result in a meaningful error in a credit report actually gave
rise to a risk of real harm in the particular case or, instead, if the violation
was so trivial that, without evidence of any further risk of harm beyond the
violation itself, no harm or risk of real harm arose.334
D. Substance Versus Procedure Is Not a Meaningful Categorical
Distinction
It is worth noting that it is fruitless to analyze the existence of procedural
standing—or statutory standing, intangible standing, or whatever else one
might label the questions of standing implicated by Lujan and Spokeo—by
331. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50.
332. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2018).
333. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, 1550 (“On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to
curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that
risk. On the other hand, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare
procedural violation.”).
334. See id. at 1550 (“A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may
result in no harm.”).
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distinguishing statutory rights that are substantive as opposed to those that
are procedural. As the Court has explained, “[T]he words ‘substantive’ and
‘procedural’ themselves . . . do not have a precise content, even (indeed
especially) as their usage has evolved.”335 “Except at the extremes, the
terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little except a
dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is largely determined
by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”336
Some observations can be made from the Court’s general unwillingness
to place weight on the traditional understanding of “substance” and
“procedure.” First, enforcement rights are plainly procedural in the
paradigmatic sense that they govern adjudication rather than real-world
conduct (though, of course, the existence of a right to sue influences the
behavior of those subject to suit). Second, intrinsically injurious intangible
rights are plausibly substantive, in a traditional sense, because they grant a
real-world right, the denial of which causes real-world injury (though, of
course, the granting of such a right is in some sense procedural in that it
enables one to file suit to adjudicate denial of that right).337
Intrinsically injurious decision-making and dignitary rights are a mixed
bag. Previous commentators often, understandably, characterized them as
procedural in that the obligation is to employ a particular procedure.338
335. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988).
336. Id. at 726; accord Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (“[W]e are
loath to enter the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural
rules.”); Buzbee, supra note 275, at 255 n.33 (“The line between substantive and procedural
agency errors is unclear.”). See generally D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and
“Procedure” Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of
“Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982) (documenting widespread
confusion about the distinction).
337. Solum, supra note 313, at 205 (“A rule is procedural if its function is to regulate
adjudication-related conduct. A rule is substantive if its function is to regulate conduct that
occurs outside the context of adjudication.”).
338. See Burt, supra note 9, at 276 (“A procedural injury occurs when an agency fails to
follow a legally required procedure, such as the preparation of an EIS, and this failure
increases the risk of future harm to some party.”); Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and
Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75,
77 n.6 (1995) (“Procedural standing is standing to ensure that a governmental agency
follows proper procedure as set out in a particular statute.”) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992)); Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 174 n.21 (“By
‘procedural rights,’ we refer (as Justice Scalia did in his Lujan footnote seven) to those rights
affirmatively conferred by statute or regulation. Procedural rights are entitlements to process
that may be divorced from any underlying ‘real-world’ desiderata . . . .”).
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More comprehensively, the medium is sometimes the message; 339 here, the
procedural right is sometimes the substance in the sense that the denial of
the procedural right is itself a concrete injury.
Finally, instrumental rights are neither fish nor fowl. Nothing is gained
by trying to characterize them as one or the other, or as some particular
chimera. Perhaps instrumental presumptively injurious rights might in some
ways lean more toward the procedural side of the ledger, whereas
instrumental automatically injurious rights are another thoroughly mixed
bag.340 The label applied, however, is not what matters. Instead, courts
should focus on questions such as whether the statutory violation itself
suffices for standing, without evidence of risk of additional harm, or if such
risk must be shown in the particular case.
V. Spokeo’s Answers, and Answers to Spokeo’s Questions
Spokeo thus establishes several new principles:
$

Statutory rights as against private parties require not only
particularized injury but also concrete injury to afford standing;

$

Instrumental statutory rights—procedural rights conferred to
further a distinct, concrete interest—are subject to procedural
standing analysis;

$

“Bare” procedural rights insufficient for standing no longer refer
solely to enforcement rights with no connection to concrete
injury—instrumental rights are also bare if not connected to
concrete injury or risk of real harm;

$

Concrete injury is established by real-world harm or risk of real
harm;

339. Cf. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
7–35 (1964).
340. See, e.g., Curtis v. Propel Prop. Tax Funding, LLC, 915 F.3d 234, 240–43 (4th Cir.
2019) (characterizing as “substantive” a statutory right prohibiting credit transactions that
require consumers to pre-authorize repayment by electronic fund transfer). The right is best
thought of as an instrumental right, one the court properly recognized as automatically
injurious, given the congressional conclusion that pre-authorization presented a categorical
risk of real harm to consumers from the creditor’s exercise of that right.
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$

In some circumstances, statutory, procedural violations
presenting a risk of real harm do not require proof of additional
concrete injury beyond the statutory violation itself;

$

History is instructive about standing, thus courts should consider
whether an intangible right has a close relationship to a harm
traditionally regarded as providing a basis for suit; and

$

Congressional judgment is important and instructive about
procedural standing, because Congress is well-positioned to
identify intangible harms that satisfy Article III, and given
Congress’s power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation to create standing that would not otherwise exist.

Spokeo and its progeny, however, leave several further questions unclear:
$

How should risk of real harm be assessed: by evaluating the risk
generally posed by violation of the statutory right in question, or
by considering the risk of real harm to a particular plaintiff?

$

When the risk of real harm is assessed by considering the risk to
a particular plaintiff, does standing exist if risk of real harm was
present at the time of violation but dissipated prior to suit?

$

When courts consider whether the procedural right at issue has a
close relationship to a historical analog affording standing, is the
existence of the analog necessary for standing, or is it simply
sufficient?

$

When should courts defer to congressional judgment in defining
injuries sufficient for standing?

$

When should courts defer to congressional judgment about the
chain of causation between an instrumental right and the risk of
real harm the instrumental right is intended to prevent?

$

How broadly should courts determine the concrete interest
Congress intends to further through an instrumental right—does
it turn on a statute’s overall purpose, or on the interest furthered
by the particular instrumental right at issue?

$

What are the steps of judicial review over questions of
procedural standing?

Observations about each of these loose ends follow. Most importantly,
much of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding procedural standing can
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be eliminated by recognizing the different categories of procedural rights
that Congress intends to enact, as enumerated in Part IV.
When Congress intends to enact an intrinsically injurious right, courts
should defer to congressional power to define injuries and thereby create
standing where none existed before. That is true for both intrinsically
injurious intangible rights and for intrinsically injurious decision-making
and dignitary rights. For all such intrinsically injurious rights, a plaintiff
need not show additional harm or risk of harm beyond violation of the
statutory right.
When Congress intends to enact an instrumental right, courts should
defer to congressional power to find chains of causation between the
instrumental right and the ultimate, real-world target interest with which
Congress is ultimately concerned.
When that instrumental right is an instrumental automatically injurious
right, Congress has determined that a real risk of concrete harm
categorically arises to the group protected by the statute as a general matter
from the statutory violation, but has determined that the harm or risk of
harm may be difficult to prove. Thus no additional harm or risk of harm
beyond the statutory violation need be shown. For such rights, the court’s
role is to review—deferentially—Congress’s judgment about the general
chain of causation between the instrumental right and the target, real-world
interest Congress intended to further. And when determining that real-world
interest, courts should consider the real-world interest furthered by the
particular statutory right or rights at issue in the case—informed by, but not
limited to, the overarching purpose of the statute as a whole.341
When that instrumental right is an instrumental presumptively injurious
right, Congress has determined that a risk of real harm is likely to exist as a
consequence of the statutory violation, but it has not determined that the
risk arises categorically for every member of the group protected by the
statute. Instead, Congress intends for the court to assess not only the
existence of the statutory violation, but also the existence of additional
harm or risk of real harm to the particular plaintiff under the facts of the
case. This determination should be made with due deference to Congress’s
determination of policy judgments and likely factual chains of causation in

341. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (“[R]easonable
statutory interpretation must account for both the specific context in which . . . language is
used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp.
v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014)).
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the face of uncertainty, but the facts of the particular case may override
such determinations or otherwise conflict with that congressional judgment.
When a court assesses whether a statutory violation resulted in harm or
risk of real harm to a particular plaintiff, that assessment should encompass
risk of real harm that existed at the time of the violation. In other words, for
standing to exist, if actual harm has not been shown, the statutory violation
must have placed the plaintiff at risk of real harm—but that risk need not
continue indefinitely or even be in existence at the time of suit. As under
the common law, risk of real harm is sufficient for standing, even when, at
the time of suit, it turns out that there is no evidence of actual harm beyond
the statutory violation.342 For instrumental automatically injurious rights,
violation of the instrumental right must generally give rise to a sufficient
risk of harm. For instrumental presumptively injurious rights, the particular
plaintiff must generally have been exposed to a risk of real harm; exposure
to that actual, real-world risk of harm is sufficient for standing, regardless
of whether that risk later dissipates.
As to the role of history, neither the language nor the reasoning of
Spokeo suggests that a historical analog is necessary for standing; they
simply suggest that it is sufficient. Spokeo refers to “historical practice” as
“instructive,” language it would not have used if it meant to convey that an
analog is necessary.343 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan,
which was both necessary for the fifth vote in Lujan and was embraced in
Spokeo, explains that “[a]s Government programs and policies become
more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of
new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law
tradition.”344 That admonition is well taken. Courts should be sensitive to
congressional judgment about new rights of action that are necessary and
proper to protect against risk of real-world harm, even if that protection is
indirect and instrumental.
VI. Problem Cases Revisited
Finally, it is useful to briefly revisit some cases raised earlier that seemed
to present intractably perplexing issues of procedural standing. Applying

342. See supra notes 115, 320–28 and accompanying text.
343. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
344. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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the approach described above greatly simplifies the analysis of standing in
these cases.
First, consider special education claims on behalf of educationally
disabled children under the IDEA. Plaintiffs bringing these claims face
what appears to be a formidable standing hurdle in that the vast majority of
the IDEA’s protections are procedural, dictating the process by which an
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) should be created, rather than the
substantive propriety of the IEP that results. If a school district fails to
follow one of the IDEA’s procedural mandates, does procedural standing
require that the child prove the existence of additional, concrete harm
beyond the procedural statutory violation itself? And how would the child
prove, for example, that a failure to include a special education teacher on
the team drafting the IEP, or to include the child’s parents as members of
the IEP team, caused the child concrete, real-world injury?
The answer is that these IDEA procedural obligations are intrinsically
injurious decision-making and dignitary rights; for purposes of standing,
there is no need to demonstrate the practical consequences of a government
actor’s failure to comply with its decision-making obligations.345 For such
decision-making rights, as the Supreme Court has explained with regard to
a failure to draft an Environmental Impact Statement, a plaintiff “who
alleges a deprivation of a procedural protection to which he is entitled never
has to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive result
would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that the procedural
step was connected to the substantive result.”346
Next, consider Frank v. Gaos, the case involving a cy pres settlement in
which the Supreme Court remanded for an assessment of procedural
standing.347 With the benefit of the framework developed above, this case is
also relatively straightforward: On the plaintiff’s version of the facts (which
should be taken as true for purposes of finding standing sufficient to permit
345. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007). Some of the IDEA’s
less-fundamental procedural obligations, not relating directly to the IEP formation process,
such as the requirement that certain waivers be in a signed writing, are likely instrumental
rights, intended to further the concrete right to knowing and voluntary waiver of that right
(and ultimately to the provision of a free and appropriate public education). But for such
rights, liability under the IDEA for the procedural violation requires that the right to a free
and appropriate education be impeded, so procedural standing imposes no additional barrier
to suit. See generally Romberg, supra note 48.
346. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518 (quoting Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla.
v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
347. 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019).
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approval of the class action settlement), Google had relayed individualized,
stored electronic information about the search terms consumers used to
reach a website.348 Setting aside the merits question of whether the statute
prohibited such conduct—an issue not relevant to standing—the violation
asserted is of an intrinsically injurious intangible right to informational
privacy. Thus, plaintiffs need not demonstrate additional harm or risk of
harm arising from unauthorized transmission of their private information in
order to have standing to assert their claim.
And what of Spokeo itself, and the claim that Spokeo had failed to
employ reasonable procedures designed to assure maximum possible
accuracy in credit reports, resulting in substantial errors in Robins’ credit
report? First, Spokeo quite reasonably (if implicitly) determined that
Congress intended to enact an instrumental right rather than an intrinsically
injurious intangible or decision-making right. Congress did not intend for a
credit reporting agency’s use of a sub-optimal procedure, in connection
with the creation of an individual’s credit report, to itself constitute concrete
injury to the individual. Most notably, if a credit reporting agency used lax
procedures to gather information but the resulting credit report was
nonetheless entirely accurate, Congress did not intend for the statute to have
been violated. Instead, Congress intended for the procedural obligation to
be instrumental, i.e., it imposed the obligation on credit reporting agencies
to follow procedures designed to assure maximum possible accuracy so as
to protect consumers from the distinct, real-world harm of erroneous credit
reports resulting from inadequate procedures.
Further, Spokeo implicitly concludes (reasonably enough) that Congress
did not intend to enact an instrumental automatically injurious right;
Congress did not believe that credit reporting agencies’ failure to follow
reasonable procedures justifies an automatic assumption of resulting realworld injury.349 A credit report created with sub-optimal procedures does
not necessarily result in error, let alone any real-world risk of harm. This
conclusion is entirely plausible, both because sub-optimal procedures do
not so regularly lead to error such that a court should automatically find
injury from the procedural shortcoming, and, even more importantly,
because resulting error in the credit report is not hard to determine or prove.
It is simple for an individual to demonstrate the existence and nature of any
errors in a resulting credit report; thus, there is no reasonable basis to
348. Id. at 1044–45.
349. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016).
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believe Congress intended for concrete injury to automatically arise from
inadequate procedures. Instead, Spokeo understood that Congress presumed
concrete injury would likely arise from the failure to follow reasonable
procedures assuring maximum possible accuracy, but intended to require
the particular consumer to show some additional real-world risk of injury.
Finally, and less obviously, Spokeo’s zip code example, discussed in
dicta, is best understood to suggest that the Court did not consider a
perfectly accurate credit report to be the real-world, target harm with which
Congress was ultimately concerned. Instead, Congress was concerned with
the real-world harm that might well arise from inaccurate credit reports. I
determined that sub-optimal procedures would likely result in erroneous
credit reports, and that credit reports containing such errors would, in turn,
likely have the potential to result in real-world harm. But Congress did not
believe these chains of causation to be automatic; Congress anticipated that
consumers would need to demonstrate further risk of harm beyond the
statutory, procedural violation itself.
This understanding explains the Court’s statement that “[i]t is difficult to
imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more,
could work any concrete harm.”350 Setting aside the infelicity of the chosen
example, what the Court meant was that the FCRA did not impose a
statutory obligation on credit reporting agencies to employ reasonable
procedures for the purpose of protecting a consumer’s target interest in a
perfectly accurate credit report, free of meaningless, technical errors.
Congress meant instead to protect consumers against some risk of realworld harm arising from errors in credit reports caused by sub-optimal
procedures.
Conclusion
Spokeo portrays itself as a modest case that establishes no new law,
simply remanding for the Ninth Circuit to apply the second half of an
injury-in-fact test that it had improperly ignored: the existence of not only
particularized but also concrete injury-in-fact. In actuality, Spokeo’s opaque
summary of procedural standing, and the confounding examples it provides,
have given rise to widespread uncertainty and confusion in the courts of
appeals and have left unanswered multiple, fundamental questions about
when statutory, procedural injuries afford standing absent evidence of
additional risk of harm.
350. Id. at 1550 (emphasis added).
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This Article has attempted to explain Spokeo’s sub silentio introduction
of instrumental rights as against private parties into the procedural standing
universe; how such instrumental rights fit into the various categories of
statutory, procedural rights that Congress enacts; and how the congressional
intent underlying each of those categories maps onto the requirements of
procedural standing applicable to each category. Properly understood,
procedural standing is neither toothless nor a fearsome gatekeeper.
There are two further reasons why Spokeo may not unduly constrain
congressional power. First, at least given the current membership of the
Supreme Court, Justice Thomas and the four liberal justices will likely
provide five votes to read procedural standing in a broader way than other
separation-of-powers issues that come before the Court.
And, more importantly in the long run, if Congress is more careful and
overt about its intent when enacting instrumental rights, courts both
should—and as a practical matter, are more likely to—defer to such
legislative determinations. Specifically, when enacting a procedural right,
Congress should overtly state the following: (1) the group and the target
right it intends to protect; (2) any causal chain it has concluded connects an
instrumental right to a target injury; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) the
category of procedural right it intends to enact, thereby making plain what
further harm or risk of harm, if any, it expects the plaintiff to demonstrate in
order to have standing. Such clarity will result in a better balance between
the legislative and judicial powers, while best promoting separation of those
powers without infringement by either branch.
Congress cannot direct the courts to violate Article III’s case or
controversy requirement by purporting to grant a plaintiff standing to
enforce a bare procedural right not actually designed to protect that
plaintiff’s concrete interests. Congress, however, has the power to define
rights that afford standing without the need for evidence of further harm.
And Congress has the power to articulate chains of causation, concluding
that risk of real harm arises from violation of an instrumental right. And
those are judgments to which the judiciary properly defers.
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